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Along with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, the Violence Against Women Act' (VAWA) could be the
most significant addition to federal civil rights laws in the last century.2
While potentially revolutionary, the VAWA's civil rights remedy forges
two problematic legal concepts-traditional civil rights jurisprudence
and "perfect" violence-into a super-remedy that risks combining the
worst aspects of each. Those who utilize and interpret the Act can avoid
this outcome by situating individual violent acts in the broader social
and historical context of gender-motivated violence.
Under current law, gender-motivated violence outside the
workplace escapes civil rights protection because it infringes no recog-
nized civil right, and often involves single perpetrators, instead of
conspiracies. Title III of the VAWA attempts to correct these problems.
First, in section 3o2(b), "Right To Be Free From Crimes Of Violence,"
i. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Unless noted otherwise, this article refers to
the Senate version of the Violence Against Women Act. The current House version
is H.R. 1133, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Previous versions of the Violence
Against Women Act are S. 15, 102d Cong., 1stSess. (1991); S. 2754, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 1502, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). This article focuses
almost exclusively on title III of the Act, the civil rights provisions, though the Act
contains six titles that legislate against various aspects of violence against women.
2. As of the last editing of this article in mid-January 1994, the future of the VAWA's
civil rights provisions has become uncertain. The Senate passed its version of the
VAWA as titles XXXII-XXXVII of the Senate Crime Bill in November 1993. H.R.
3355, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The House also passed its version of the
VAWA in November, but without the civil rights title. Though the House VAWA,
including the civil rights provisions, had 222 co-sponsors-a majority of the
Representatives-key Democrats on the Judiciary Committee balked at the last
minute, alleging that they had not had enough time for extensive hearings on the
provisions. The conflicting versions of the Act will go to a conference committee.
Since the civil rights provisions may not pass on their own, inclusion of the Senate's
version of title III into the final conference bill is vital.
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the VAWA creates a positive statutory right: "All persons within the
United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence
motivated by gender .... "3 In its next section, the VAWA establishes
its own cause of action:
A person (including a person who acts under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State)
who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and
thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b)
shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the
recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive
and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may
deem appropriate. 4
Unlike other civil rights statutes for private violence, this statute con-
tains no conspiracy requirement. An individual person, such as a rapist
or batterer acting alone, may deprive another person of the right to be
free from gender-motivated violence. On paper, the VAWA fills the
"gender gap" in current civil rights laws.
In practice, the success of the VAWA's civil rights remedy will
depend on how judges interpret the Act in actual cases. One might
argue, perhaps cynically, that judges will interpret the VAWA as nar-
rowly as possible, either because they dislike having a broad range of
"domestic" cases filling otherwise busy dockets, 5 or because they are
3. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(b) (1993).
4. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(c) (1993).
5. In 1991, the Judicial Conference of the United States officially opposed the
VAWA's civil rights provisions because they would "embroil the federal courts in
domestic relations disputes." REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc
COMMITTEE ON GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 1 (Sept. 1991). Moreover, the provisions
would "flood [federal courts] with cases that have been traditionally within the
province of state courts." REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMIT-
TEE ON GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE, supra at 7. In his year-end report, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that federal courts should be "reserved for issues where important
national interests predominate." William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-
End Report on the Federal Judiciay, 24 THE THIRD BRANCH 1 (1992). He then
endorsed the Judicial Conference's opposition to the VAWA, and reiterated that it
"could involve the federal courts in a whole host of domestic relations disputes."
Rehnquist, supra at 3.
The Judicial Conference noted with approval the official opposition of the Con-
ference of Chief Justices of the States. These state judges opposed the VAWA's civil
rights provisions because they would "be invoked as a bargaining tool within the
context of divorce negotiations and add a major complicating factor to an environ-
ment which is often acrimonious as it is .... The issue of inter-spousal litigation
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largely unsympathetic to gender-based claims.6 However, given the
enforcement of previous civil rights laws, such as Title VII, most judges
will probably read the Act in a good faith attempt to construe its
appropriate meaning. In the case of the VAWA, this process will in-
volve judges interpreting the Act as the intersection of two legal con-
cepts: traditional civil rights jurisprudence and gender-motivated
violence. Because of the "gendered" historical development of each
goes to the very core of familial relationships . " Violence Against Women:
Victims of the System: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 15 a
Bill to Combat Violence and Crimes Against Women on the Streets and in Homes,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 315 (1991) [hereinafter Violence Against Women Hearing]
(statement of the Conference of Chief Justices of the States, submitted by The
Honorable Vincent L. McKusick, President). Senator Biden responded to the
judicial opposition:
Not only have you improperly read the statute, your comments verge
dangerously dose to the kind of stereotypes we condemn. To put the
collective force of the federal judiciary behind the assumption that
women-unlike other groups-will file false and vindictive civil rights
claims suggests the very gender-biased stereotypes that my legislation was
intended, in part, to dispel.
Letter from Sen. Biden to Hon. Thomas M. Reaveley, then Chair of the Ad Hoc
Committee on Gender-Based Violence of the Judicial Conference (Sept. 20, 1991)
(on file with author).
In March 1993, the Judicial Conference of the United States withdrew its
opposition to the civil rights provisions. For a more in-depth discussion of the
opposition, see Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women Jurisdiction, and
the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1682, 1687-89 (1991). See also Mary Wis-
niewski, Judges Oppose Federal Spouse Abuse Bill, CHI. DAILy L. BULL., Oct. 4,
1991, at 2, 14; Ann Pelham & Garry Sturgess, Domestic Relations in Federal Court,
LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 21, 1991, at 7; Rorie Sherman, Fears Expressed On Proposed Bill
To Aid Women, NAT' L.J., June 3, 1991, at 3, 16.
Not surprisingly, Rehnquist's and McKusick's sentiments on the VAWA are nor
shared by all their colleagues. The 1000-member National Association of Women
Judges endorses the legislation: "The National Association of Women Judges
believes that the creation of a federal civil rights remedy will provide needed
congressional recognition that gender-based violence is a national problem. [The
VAWA helps] achieve this without interfering with the administration of justice in
either the state or federal courts." Hearings on H.R. 1133 Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 63 (1993) (statement of the Honorable Judith Billings, Judge of the Utah
Court of Appeals and President of the National Association of Women Judges).
6. Aside from the overt sexism of some judges, federal courts structurally exclude
gender in a number of ways from the "domestic relations exception" to the relative
absence of women from key jobs. See generally Resnik, supra note 5. See alo Bonnie
Moore, Federal Jurisdiction and the Domestic Relations Exception: A Search for
Parameters, 31 UCLA L. REv. 843 (1984).
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concept, in practice they often work to the detriment of women.
Traditional civil rights models are gendered because they were
developed to remedy harms directed primarily against men. To the
extent that women suffered the same harms, they received civil rights
protection. Harms unique to women or disproportionately suffered by
women largely fell outside of civil rights scrutiny. It is not accidental
that traditional civil rights models excluded many gender-related harms,
such as rape. Too often civil rights doctrines have worked in conjunc-
tion with other social institutions to trivialize the importance of gender-
based violence by labeling such violence as aberrant, private, personal,
or individual and therefore outside of the realm of violence that merits
serious legal remedies.
Likewise, the legal construction of what constitutes gender-
motivated violence often functions to distort its reality. "Perfect"
violence fits a narrow legal narrative of gender-motivation. "Real rapes"
count as bona fide gender-motivated crimes, as do serial murders of
women. As Professor Susan Estrich discusses, "real rape" is a conception
of sexual violence which evokes a black stranger who brutally attacks a
white woman, leaving scars and bruises, while she resists to the utmost.7
Anything "less" than this paradigmatic example often fails to satisfy the
socio-legal demand for the extreme "perfect" case. The "perfect" case is
not only gendered, but also racial, as sexual assault has been defined
historically in racial terms.
Good faith interpretation of the VAWA's civil rights remedy might
reflect this gendered logic and deprive many women of the remedy
promised by the legislation, unless judges understand and actively reject
it. The limited range of cognizable civil rights violations depends on
complex public-private dichotomies that exclude from judicial review
those actions deemed private, such as violence against women. Further,
traditional civil rights arguments may fail to address the historical
context of gender-motivated violence, the multiple motivations behind
it, and the nature of the harms it causes.
Civil rights actions under the VAWA will most likely succeed
against two types of violence: those acts of gender-motivated violence
which resemble either racially-motivated violence or those which
resemble what Estrich labels "real rape." The "strongest" cases will
resemble both. Cases which do not fit these models may escape judicial
remedy. It would be tragic if those acts which comprise the bulk of
7. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987).
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gender-motivated violence-such as domestic battering and acquain-
tance rape-make for the "weakest" cases.
Gendered logic is not irreversibly built into the foundation of civil
rights theory. New legal constructions of civil rights which respond to
the empirical reality of gender-motivated violence can transform un-
responsive legal theories, but only if historically grounded. Civil rights
laws may appear irredeemably sexist, but they are not. Indeed, unless
judges move beyond contemporary legal understandings that marginal-
ize gender, the Act is scarcely more than an empty consecration of
unusable doctrine. The legislative history as a whole simply does not
support such a narrow reading.
For victims of gender-motivated violence, a federal civil rights
remedy will provide a critical legal tool for articulating individual and
group harm while challenging institutional complicity in that harm.
Even with the dangers of utilizing a rights-based argument to claim
remedies for victims of gender-motivated violence, civil rights
jurisprudence provides the best available legal tool-short of a radical
legal revolution-for ensuring the safety of those harmed by such
violence. The test of a new civil rights law should be its ability to
address concrete historical disadvantages and provide protection to those
most socially powerless. 8
Section I explores the legal models previously developed to address
civil rights violations. The VAWA remedies the obvious structural
barriers to granting a civil rights cause of action to victims of gender-
motivated violence. In many ways, the VAWA extends the logic of sex-
based remedies available under Title VII beyond the workplace and
adds protections for gender-motivated violence analogous to those
found in other civil rights laws.
Ironically, the VAWA implicitly relies on a model of collective
violence that structurally excludes many forms of gender-motivated
violence. It does this by transferring the model of "bias" or "hate"
crimes, developed to address racially and religiously motivated actions,
to gender-motivated violence. The classic hate crime scenario covers
certain forms of "bias" violence that are societally conditioned and
institutionally supported to the exclusion of others that are no less
invidious. Only "public" acts impede citizenship and deserve civil rights
remedies. Acts that are "private" and individualized, defensible as
8. See generally Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights Remedies for Battered Women: Axiomatic
& Ignored, 11 LAW & INEQ. J. 1 (1992).
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"personal animosity," do not constitute discrimination. Civil rights
violations are theorized as collective, as when someone is randomly
selected for violence based on their membership in a group. In the case
of violence motivated by gender, this psychologically unsophisticated
narrative of violence will work against women. Violence against women
is often defined as private and personal, no matter how tenuously
acquainted the parties involved are. The original radicalism of
Reconstruction civil rights statutes-which embodied the idea of the
centrality of bodily security from private violence as a prerequisite for
civic participation-has been lost. The gendered nature of the model of
bias violence makes it unresponsive to gender-motivated violence. The
addition of gender to theories developed to address other forms of
violence can transform the theories, but only if the theories confront
gender-motivated violence on its own terms.
Section II explores four specific problems in the application of the
VAWA. The first two problems result from the use of a differential
treatment test in civil rights jurisprudence. Discrimination is measured
by a differential treatment test which asks whether a person would not
have experienced an action "but for" an identified characteristic. The
first result of this analysis is that it cuts identities apart. VAWA plain-
tiffs may have to choose either sex or race-but not both-as the basis
of their claims. Second, not only does the differential treatment test fail
to construct lives as they are lived-why must an African-American
woman when raped by a white man choose race or sex as the basis of
her legal claim when neither suffices?-but also, when applied to sexual
violence, this test obscures the nature of inequality and abuse. The
differential treatment approach relegates questions of sexuality and
power inequalities to the periphery. A battering husband, for example,
may not batter all women with whom he comes into contact, so his
behavior may look more like "personal animosity" than discrimination.
The other two problerms arise from the legal narrative of gender-
motivated violence. First, the VAWA creates a force requirement for its
cause of action-crimes of violence must be violent felonies, which
exclude most domestic violence. Because of the VAWA's excessive
definition of force, victims might have to prove force beyond the defini-
tion of the crime itself, risking that courts will read into "force"
requirements similar to ones traditionally used in criminal rape trials.
The definition of "crime of violence" also relies upon state law defini-
tions. This perpetuates the worst aspects of federalism by creating a
federal civil rights remedy dependent upon the very state laws whose
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
inadequacies are part of the justification for the federal remedy itself.
Second, the VAWA carries forward the tragic history of race and
sexual violence by subtly incorporating discourses of racism into its
conception of violence against women. The effect is not only that men
of color-especially Native American men, who are disproportionately
affected by federal law-will incur greater penalties under the VAWA
than white men, but also that women of color will not receive the
protection they should. Congress must work against racist meanings of
sexual violence in order to curtail perpetuating the potentially racist uses
of the Act.
Section III outlines a number of suggested changes to the statutory
language and scope of the VAWA. Without more congressional
guidance, courts may interpret the Act narrowly. The section concludes
by outlining twelve reasons why a civil rights remedy is needed for
gender-motivated violence.
Throughout these three sections, the article develops an implicit
notion of what should constitute gender-motivated violence. Gender
encompasses more than biological sex; it includes the social construction
of sex-role behaviors, attitudes; and expectations, as well as the social
relationships that result from those behaviors, attitudes, and expecta-
tions. Gender-motivated violence, therefore, is not simply violence that
occurs primarily against women. As used in this article it includes: (i)
certain enumerated crimes, such as rape, sexual assault, 'sexual abuse,
abusive sexual contact, battering of spouses or intimate partners, and
stalking; (2) violence committed to modify the victim's sex-role be-
haviors or attitudes; (3) violence committed because of the perpetrator's
sex-role behaviors or attitudes in order to control the victim's thoughts,
beliefs, or actions, or in order to punish the victim for resisting the
perpetrator's control; and (4) violence motivated in whole or in part by
the sex or gender of the victim.9 An investigation into gender-motiva-
tion must necessarily focus on the historical, political, psychological,
and cultural meanings of the violence, because many acts of violence
often appear personal, private, or random when viewed independently,
even when the acts form part of a broader pattern.
The VAWA defines "crime of violence motivated by gender" as "a
crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of
9. This language derives from various authors. One example is Andrea Brenneke. See
Brenneke, supra note 8. The sources of each component of the definition are cited
below as they are discussed.
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gender; and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's
gender."' Read against the history of civil rights jurisprudence and
stereotypes about sex-based violence, this legal formulation will poten-
tialy exclude more gender-motivated violence than it includes.
I. DEVELOPING THE MODELS
Until the law reflects an understanding of relationships of inequality
and underlying power structures, those who experience gender-
motivated violence, especially from acquaintances, will not receive full
protection from the legal system. Simply adding gender to existing
models of discrimination may not be enough to ensure an adequate
legal remedy for gender-motivated violence.
A. The Gender Gap in Current Federal Civil Rights Laws
The civil rights provisions of the VAWA grow out of traditional civil
rights jurisprudence, developed primarily by Congress and courts to
address certain forms of racial discrimination. Throughout the historical
development of these doctrines, this jurisprudence has not addressed
gender-motivated violence. The VAWA can only be understood as an
outgrowth of existing laws and its vitality will depend on how courts
interpret it against this background. Courts will apply many of the
limitations of current doctrines to the VAWA, absent more specific
statutory language and congressional guidance.
The authors of the VAWA wrote it to correct a perceived "gender
gap"' 11 in current civil rights laws. This section explores what they
identified as the reasons for and sites of the gap, the mechanics of the
VAWA's gap fillers, and the possible limits of these corrective measures.
The authors correctly identified many of the surface reasons for the gap.
However, they ignored deeper structural problems, which unfortunately
leave courts with ample opportunity to deny a broad reading of the
VAWA's civil rights remedies.
Two federal statutes provide most of the limited civil rights
remedies that exist for "private" violence: section z of the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 'conspiracy to interfere
10. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(d)(1) (1993).
ii. S. Rep. No. 138, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 48 (1993) [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 138].
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with civil rights,"'12 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 13
Section 1985(3) has little practical application to victims of gender-
motivated violence. First, based on the Court's turbid analysis of the
meaning of sex under § 1985(3), it is unclear whether the Ku Klux Klan
Act's remedies against violent discrimination apply to women. Second,
§ 1985(3) covers only conspiratorial attacks, which account for very little
of gender-motivated violence. Instead, the most "common and damag-
ing form of gender discrimination [is] acts of violence committed by
private individuals acting alone." 14 Finally, recent court decisions have
emphasized that § 1985(3) applies only to a narrow range of actions
which contains no element of state involvement or complicity. Al-
though Title VII covers private action, it applies only to work-related
acts, and therefore excludes most gender-motivated violence taking place
in the home and in the streets.
1. Conspiracy, State Action, and Private Violence
Aside from § 1985(3) and Title VII, most federal civil rights statutes
contain an explicit "state action" requirement. For example, 4z U.S.C.
§ 1983, also part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, provides a civil rights
cause of action for any person deprived "of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" by another person
who acts "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory." The 196o case of Monroe v. Pape15
clarified "under color of law": "'Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of
state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with
the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law.' "'1
12. Section 1985(3) is now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1988), though it is
customary to refer to it by its old name.
13. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). In
this context "private" violence is not distinguished from "public" violence, but
rather from violence that contains an element of state action. Within this meaning,
"private" is better rendered as "non-state," in the sense of persons acting on their
own.
14. S. Rep. No. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 42 n.35 (1991) [hereinafter S. Rep. No.
197] (quoting NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WOMEN (NOW) LEGAL DEFENSE AND
EDUCATION FUND, FAcTs ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROVISION 4 (Oct. 1991)). Inter-
estingly, rarely in the legislative history is rape by more than one assailant even
mentioned.
15. 365 U.S. 167 (1960).
16. Id. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326).
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For example, state agents, such as police officers, who misuse their
official powers come under the jurisdiction of these statutes. According
to Justice Blackmun, the legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act
indicates that the 42d Congress enacted a state action requirement in
§ 1983 because it "was concerned that state instrumentalities could not
protect those [federally created] rights; it realized that state officers
might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights; and it
believed that these failings extended to the state courts."' 7 Uncaring,
ignorant, hostile, or even actively oppressive state and local governments
might choose to avoid enforcing individual rights, necessitating a federal
response.
The 4 zd Congress did not believe that governments posed the only
threat to individuals' civil rights; it also believed that conspiracies not
committed "under color of" state law could also deprive persons of
federally protected rights. Indeed, such "private" acts might be the
primary barrier to exercising these rights. Thus, it enacted § 1985(3) as a
private non-state action counterpart to § 1983. Section 1985(3) provides
that:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire...
for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws,
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for
the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted
authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing
to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protec-
tion of the laws; ... in any case of conspiracy set forth in
this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or
cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or
property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured
or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or
more of the conspirators.' 8
17. Harry Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the
Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 1, 6 (1985) (quoting
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
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As understood by the 4 2d Congress, "private" acts of violence during
Reconstruction, such as Klan terrorism, deprived both newly eman-
cipated blacks and whites who supported blacks' civil rights of the
means to exercise their federal rights. Though state and local laws
nominally outlawed much of the violence that became actionable under
§§ 1983 and 1985(3), patterns of non-enforcement and local complicity
justified the creation of a federal civil rights remedy.
During the Ku Klux Klan Act's first century, however, § 1985(3)
lay dormant because the Supreme Court in 1883, in United States v.
Harris,19 nullified the Act's private conspiracy language. 20 Not until the
1971 case of Griffin v. Breckenridge2' did the Supreme Court resurrect
§ 1985(3) to provide a cause of action for private non-state con-
spiracies. 22 In Griffin, the Court created a four-part test to establish a
§ 1985(3) claim:
To prevail a plaintiff must prove that the defendants: (I)
engaged in a conspiracy; (z) for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons the
equal protection of the laws, or the equal privileges and im-
munities under the laws; (3) acted in furtherance of the con-
spiracy; and (4) deprived such person or class of persons the
exercise of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States. 23
Under the Griffin test, § 1985(3) is not a "general federal tort law"
because the "language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or
equal immunities" requires proving "some racial, or perhaps otherwise
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators'
action." 24 Since only members of a protected class may seek remedies
under this section, not all actions which deprive persons of their rights
will be actionable. Under Griffin, § 1985(3) also does not cover situa-
tions in which perpetrators act alone, even if they deprive a person in a
protected category of a protected right-two or more persons must
19. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
20. Id. at 644.
21. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
22. Id. at 101.
23. Bruce Brown, Injunctive Relief and Section 1985(3): Anti-Abortion Blockaders Meet
the "Ku Klux Klan Act," 39 BUFF. L. Rtv. 855, 860 (1991) (citing Griffin, 403 U.S.
at 102-03).
24. Brown, supra note 23, at 860 (citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101-02).
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commit actions in furtherance of the conspiracy.25 Although Griffn did
reject the rigid "state action" requirement, it replaced it with a "state
involvement" requirement 26 that may pose similar problems.
Though designed for the Reconstruction South, the Ku Klux Klan
Act does not protect only blacks. The Act's sponsor, Senator Edmunds
of Vermont, stated that if "it should appear that this conspiracy was
formed against this man because he was a Democrat... or because he
was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter... then this section
could reach it."27 In practice, the Court has only extended § 1985(3) to
classes of individuals covered by traditional equal protection analysis,
namely "those so-called 'discrete and insular' minorities that receive
special protection under the Equal Protection Clause [of the Fourteenth
Amendment] because of inherent personal characteristics." 28 For ex-
ample, classifications based on race, illegitimacy, alienage, and national
origin all command strict judicial scrutiny. Courts do not include sex
and sexual orientation on this list. Distinctions based on sex receive
some scrutiny, though not strict scrutiny, while distinctions based on
sexual orientation receive no judicial scrutiny at all.29
Historically, Fourteenth Amendment-based remedies, such as
1985(3), have afforded little protection for women. The legislative
history of the Fourteenth Amendment indicates that women were not
considered "persons" when Congress debated the amendment in 1866:
In debates on the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, congressional repudiations of the notion that it would
guarantee women's rights centered on suffrage, with little
consideration of whether section 1 would grant women equal
protection of the laws in areas other than the vote. In the
exchanges, Senator Howard claimed that Madison would have
granted suffrage to the "whole negro population as a class."
Senator Johnson asked whether Madison would have included
women, given that he used the term "persons." Senator
Howard responded, "I believe Mr. Madison was old enough
25. Brown, supra note 23, at 860.
26. Brown, supra note 23, at 860.
27. Brown, supra note 23, at 859 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567
(1871)).
28. Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1150 (6th Cir. 1980). "Discrete and insular" as
a category of minorities was first discussed in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1934).
29. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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and wise enough to take it for granted there was such a thing
as the law of nature which has a certain influence even in
political affairs, and that by that law women and children
were not regarded as the equals of men."30
Perhaps because of the Court's reliance on the same "law of nature," it
was not until 1971 that it concluded that unequal treatment of women
might violate the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.3 1
Whether and how § 1985(3) applies to women are questions that
the Supreme Court has never fully answered despite last term's decision
in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic.32 In Bray, a clinic that
provides abortions brought suit against anti-choice blockaders, contend-
ing the blockaders violated § 1985(3) by conspiring to deprive the civil
rights of women using the clinics. Justice Scalia wrote for the majority:
[The Clinic's] contention .. .is that the alleged class-based
30. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1283 n.12 (1991) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2767 (1866)).
The contradictions were evident during the proceedings, though conspicuously
underplayed. For example:
During the February [1866] debates in the House, Robert Hale of New
York, one of the Republicans who opposed the "necessary and proper"
draft, challenged Bingham and Stevens on this point. Would the amend-
ment strike down the legal disabilities imposed on married women? No,
replied Stevens; not as long as all married women and all unmarried
women were treated alike, "where all of the same class are dealt with in
the same way, then there is no pretense of inequality." This admission
was fatal, and Hale saw it right away: ".... then by parity of reasoning it
would be sufficient if you extended to one negro the same rights you do
to another, but not those you extend to a white man." Stevens did not
respond to this logic and neither did anyone else.
JUDITH BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 90 (1983) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063-64
(1866)).
31. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
32. 122 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1993). The Court stated:
We said that "the language [of § 1985(3)] requiring intent to deprive of
equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there
must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously dis-
criminatory animus behind the conspirators' action."
We have not yet had occasion to resolve the "perhaps"; only in Griffin
itself have we addressed and upheld a claim under § 1985(3), and that
case involved race discrimination.
Id. at 46 (citation omitted).
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discrimination is directed not at 'women seeking abortion' but
at women in general. We find it unnecessary to decide
whether that is a qualifying class under § 1985(3), since the
claim that petitioners' opposition to abortion reflects an
animus against women in general must be rejected.33
The legislative history of § 1985(3) provides limited guidance. During
the 1871 debate on the Ku Klux Klan Act, Representative Buckley stated
that "[t]he proposed legislation ... is not to protect Republicans only
in their property, liberties, and lives, but Democrats as well, not the
colored only, but the Whites also; yes, even women."34 Aside from the
conspiracy requirement, which limits the utility of § 1985(3) for most
victims of gender-motivated violence, the fundamental question of
whether it even covers women makes it unattractive as a remedy.
2. Deprivation of Rights and State Involvement
Assuming women qualify as a class under § 1985(3), they still face
obstacles to using it as a remedy. Section 1985(3) does not itself provide
substantive rights, instead, it remedies deprivations of rights, privileges,
and immunities originating outside the statute. In the case of gender-
motivated violence, this creates an insurmountable burden for victims.
For example, no federal court has ever held that rape is a civil rights
violation motivated by gender-unless the rapist were a supervisor, in
which case the rape might establish a sexually hostile working environ-
ment to support an employment discrimination claim. 35 Never has a
gang rape or conspiratorial rape been the basis of a successful § 1985(3)
action.36
Aside from establishing a specific constitutionally protected right, a
victim of gender-motivated violence might have to prove "state involve-
ment" for a § 1985(3) claim. The Court in United Brotherhood of
Carpenters &Joiners, Local 6io v. Scott37 ruled that when plaintiffs assert
33. Bray, 122 L. Ed. 2d. at 46.
34. Mary F Leheny, A Question of Class: Does 42 US.C. Section 1985(3) Protect Women
Who Are Barred From Abortion Clinics, 60 FoRaDHAm L. REv. 715, 726 n.63 (1992)
(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 190 (1871)).
35. Meritor Say. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
36. Researching or proving a non-occurrence, of course, presents problems of complete-
ness. Based on thorough research, however, it seems unlikely that a gang rape has
ever been the basis of an unsuccessful § 1985(3) action.
37. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
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deprivation of a right that is constitutionally protected only against state
interference (such as First Amendment speech rights), they must prove
the state "was somehow involved in or affected by the conspiracy."38
This "state involvement" requirement is not the same as the "state
action" requirement found in other civil rights jurisprudence. Justice
Blackmun defined state involvement by stating that "if private persons
take conspiratorial action that prevents or hinders the constituted
authorities of any State from giving or securing equal treatment, the
private persons would cause those authorities to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment; the private persons would then have violated § x985(3)."39
The decision in Carpenters will likely deny victims of gender-
motivated violence a remedy under § 1985(3). Professor Derrick Bell
views Carpenters as "effectively depriv[ing] the statute of any force it
once had" 40 and rendering the section "virtually useless as a civil rights
remedy."41 To Bell, the state involvement language amounts to a de
facto state action requirement.42 In Bray, the Court emphasized that
only involuntary servitude and interference with interstate travel are
exceptions to the state involvement requirement:
The statute does not apply, we said, to private conspiracies
that are "aimed at a right that is by definition a right only
against state interference," but applies only to such con-
spiracies as are "aimed at interfering with rights ... protected
against private, as well as official, encroachment." There are
few such rights (we have hitherto recognized only the
38. Id. at 833.
39. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 384 (1979). In
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), Justice Rehnquist
devised a rest for the stricter "state action" requirement by stating that "the inquiry
must be whether there is a sufficiently dose nexus between the State and the
challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be
fairly treated as that of the State itself." Id. at 351. This "nexus" is loosened in state
involvement cases.
40. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw 319 (1992).
41. BELL, supra note 40, at 321.
42. Others have also argued that Carpenters insulates private conspiracies from judicial
protection. BELL, supra note 40, at 319 n.6. See Martin Dolan, Comment, State
Inaction and Section 1985(3): United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of
America v. Scott, 71 IowA L. REv. 1271 (1986); Taunya Lovell Banks, Rethinking
Novotny in Light of United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v.
Scott: The Scope and Constitutionally Permissible Periphery of Section 1985(3), 27
How. L.J. 1497 (1984).
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Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary
servitude, and, in the same Thirteenth Amendment context,
the right of interstate travel). The right to abortion is not
among them. 43
Overturning lower courts' decisions, the Bray Court rejected the claims
that interference with interstate travel occurred during the clinic block-
ades and that the anti-choice blockaders' tactics prevented the local
authorities from guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for women.
This miserly interpretation will limit the applicability of § 1985(3)
in future cases of private, non-state conspiracies. Derrick Bell argues
that without reaching private conspiracies, civil rights statutes safeguard
nothing: "Any legislation that premises relief upon proving affirmative
governmental complicity fails to reach the vast majority of conduct
which threatens protected rights." 44 Archibald Cox adds that:
The struggle for civil rights makes it all too plain that
Equality requires more than abstractly equal status in terms of
legal doctrine .... Bare legal rights ... carry little meaning
for the victim of intimidation and reprisals in a hostile com-
munity .... Any government committed to the promotion of
racial equality and other human rights must concern itself, if
it can, with the activities of private individuals. 45
Having to prove either state action or state involvement makes it
difficult for women to bring actions under § 1985(3). Assuming that the
Supreme Court will find "women as a group" a "qualifying class" for
§ 1985(3) analysis, 46 such victims would need to prove they have been
43. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 122 L. Ed. 2d 34, 52 (1993) (citations
omitted).
44. BELL, supra note 40, at 321.
45. BELL, supra note 40, at 321 (quoting Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term
Forward: Constitutional Adludication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HAtv.
L. REv. 91, 108 (1966)).
46. The majority opinion in Bray suggests that rape would not count as a violation of
women's civil rights, but merely as a tort that affects a group of otherwise unrelated
persons. "[Tihe class 'cannot be defined simply as the group of victims of the
tortious action.' 'Women seeking abortion' is not a qualifying class." Bray, 122 L.
Ed. 2d at 46 (citation omitted). By this reasoning, "women who have been raped"
is not a qualifying class, as they are merely victims of a tort that affects "a group of
unrelated persons," especially since violence against a woman is often understood as
a private, individual act. Changing the group to "women who have been or may
someday be raped" transforms the analysis, as would changing the group under Bray
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deprived of a protected right by a conspiracy of two or more persons.
For a victim of a conspiratorial act of violence motivated by
gender-such as a gang rape-finding a deprivation of rights cognizable
under § 1985(3) is a difficult task. A victim of a gang rape could argue
that her rights of association were denied. But, since this First Amend-
ment right is not among those protected from purely private non-state
conspiracies, she would have to demonstrate state involvement, a nearly
impossible burden given the decisions cited above. To avoid having to
prove state involvement, a gang rape victim might alternately argue that
her attack was a badge and incident of slavery under the meaning of
the Thirteenth Amendment, because her attack results from a status
rooted in a history analogous to involuntary servitude or slavery. This
argument would require an ahistorical reduction of womanhood to
antebellum slavery, and has doubtful potential to command a majority
on a federal court. 47
A gang rape victim's remaining cognizable claim is that her rapists
deprived her of the constitutional right to interstate travel: forcibly held
and repeatedly raped for a period of time.48 However, the interstate
travel argument is less plausible after Bray, since it strictly reads the
requirements set out in United States v. Guest.49 In Guest, the Court
created a predominant purpose test to measure interference with inter-
state travel:
[A] conspiracy to rob an interstate traveler would not, of
to "women who seek or may someday seek abortions."
47. However, since the Thirteenth Amendment has been used to protect whites as well
as blacks, the argument is less dubious. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273 (1976). Congress has the power under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment to identify and outlaw badges and incidents of slavery. Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor:
Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. &
FEMINiSM 207 (1992). See also Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse
as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARv L. Rav. 1359
(1992).
48. Similar arguments are used in religious "deprogramming" cases when persons are
held against their will and subjected to physical or emotional injury. See Colombrito
v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 1985); Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45, 48
(4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982). See also Richard Delgado, When
Religious Exercise Is Not Free: Deprogramming and the Constitutional Status of
Coercively Induced Belief, 37 VuaND. L. Rav. 1071 (1984); Ken Gromley, Private
Conspiracies and the Constitution: A Modem Vision of 42 U.SC. Section 1985(3), 64
TEx. L. Ray. 527 (1985).
49. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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itself, violate [the criminal counterpart to § 1985(3)]. But if
the predominant purpose of the conspiracy is to impede or
prevent the exercise of the right of interstate travel, or to
oppress a person because of his exercise of that right, then
S.. the conspiracy becomes a proper object of [this] federal
law .... 50
The Bray Court also stated:
Our discussion in Carpenters makes clear that it does not
suffice for application of § 1985(3) that a protected right be
incidentally affected. A conspiracy is not "for the purpose" of
denying equal protection simply because it has an effect upon
a protected right. The right must be "aimed at."5l
A victim of gang rape would have to prove that the rapists aimed at
depriving her of her right of interstate travel-that such "impairment
[was] a conscious objective of the enterprise" 2-an implausible
scenario. Moreover, how does one convince a jury not versed in the
highly nuanced intricacies of federally-protected civil rights that inter-
state travel has anything to do with sexual violence? Except in the case
of gang rapists who attack a victim with the conscious intent to deprive
her of the right to interstate travel, § 1985(3) is a remedy with little or
no utility for gender-motivated violence.
3. Gender-Motivated Violence and Citizenship
Gender-motivated violence is not yet understood as a civil rights issue
because courts do not understand that it involves any deprivation of
rights necessary for the exercise of citizenship. In Griffin, the Court
defined an "animus" requirement for civil rights actions against private
violence under § 1985(3).53 It quoted Representative Shellabarger's state-
ment during the congressional debates on the Ku Klux Klan Act that
§ 1985(3) applied only,
to the prevention of deprivations which shall attack the
5o. Guest, 383 U.S. at 760.
51. Bray, 122 L. Ed. 2d at 50 (citing United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners,
Local 610, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983).
52. Bray, 122 L. Ed. 2d at 50.
53. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100 (1971).
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equality of rights of American citizens; that any violation of
the right, the animus and effect of which is to strike down the
citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as
contrasted with his and other citizens' rights, shall be within
the scope of the remedies .... 54
Existing civil rights laws remedy state deprivation of rights-such as
speech rights or voting rights-because such deprivations, as viewed by
the Court, "strike down the citizen." Existing civil rights laws may also
reach private violence, but only if the courts believe the violence rises to
this same level of public harm. The animus requirement ensures that
other private deprivations of rights fall outside of civil rights scrutiny,
unless they include a sufficient level of state involvement. Under the
VAWA, a crime of violence must "be due, at least in part, to an animus
based on the victim's gender," 55 so the meaning of animus will have an
important effect on the scope of the legislation.
In practice, what "animus" means is unclear. The majority in Bray
reiterated that: "We do not think that the 'animus' requirement can be
met only by maliciously motivated, as opposed to assertedly benign
(though objectively invidious), discrimination against women. It does
demand, however, at least a purpose that focuses upon women by reason
of their sex ...."56 These comments suggest two problems for victims
of gender-motivated violence. First, the scope of actions that justify a
judicial remedy must have the effect of striking down the citizen.
54. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 100 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 478
(1871)).
55. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(d)(1)(1993).
56. Bray, 122 L. Ed. 2d at 46. Justice Stevens believes that the majority's argument-
that animus could be found if sex-based intent existed-still excludes many "invid-
iously discriminatory" actions:
The ... proposition [that animus exists if there is sex-based intent]
appears to describe a malevolent form of hatred'or ill-will. When such an
animus defends itself as opposition to conduct that a given class engages
in exclusively or predominantly, we can readily unmask it as the intent to
discriminate against the class itself. Griffin itself, for instance, involved
behavior animated by the desire to keep African-American citizens from
exercising their constitutional rights. The defendants were no less guilty of
a class-based animus because they also opposed the cause of desegregation
or rights of African-American suffrage, and the Court did not require the
plaintiffs in Griffin to prove that their beatings were motivated by hatred
for African-Americans.
Id. at 78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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Which harms count in civil rights analysis depends on which harms
courts believe impede a person's exercise of citizenship. When
perpetrated by private individuals, involuntary servitude and deprivation
of interstate travel deny citizenship-sexual violence apparently does
not. Second, what constitutes animus may have important consequences
for which actions courts recognize as motivated by gender. In both
cases, the meaning of "animus" will help determine the scope of the
VAWA civil rights provisions. Since the Court's definition of animus
defines civil rights and citizenship in terms of each other, even if the
VAWA contained no animus langauge, courts might incorrectly imply
it anyway.
Legal scholar Brande Stellings argues that the concept of
citizenship, which "is about responsibility to the community and the
community's responsibility to its members," 57 requires that gender-
motivated violence be understood as a civil rights violation: "Recogni-
zing that sexual violence infringes upon women's civil rights is not only
consistent with the idea of citizenship but is required by it. The com-
mitment to public participation and deliberation which is integral to
any theory of citizenship requires acknowledgment of 'rights that bridge
the personal and the political.' "58 Such violence merits public attention
because it denies its victims the ability to participate in democratic
society: "Practices which substantially impair the capacity of a group to
participate in the democratic process on the same terms as others
prevent this group from fulfilling its responsibilities and exercising its
rights." 59 Civil rights and citizenship can only be understood in terms
of each other. Because of this relationship, civil rights laws must some-
times redress forms of violence committed by private individuals.
This recognition of the interrelationship of private violence and
impairment of citizenship rights is not new. Stellings notes that the
Congress during Reconstruction understood this connection as it related
to blacks:
One lesson to be drawn from this historical example is that
control over bodily autonomy is a core concern of citizenship.
Certainly, the legacy of slavery made this lesson more ap-
57. Brande Stellings, The Public Harm of Private Violence: Rape, Sex Discrimination and
Citizenship, 28 HAtv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 185, 209 (1993).
58. Stellings, supra note 57, at 209 (quoting Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE
L.J. 1493, 1535 (1988)).
59. Stellings, supra note 57, at 209.
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parent. Physical shackles had not long been removed when
they were replaced by the shackles of physical intimidation
and terrorization. The connection between overt and covert
subjugation was not lost on the public consciousness: in I866
Congress passed a Civil Rights Act that guaranteed, among
other rights of citizenship, "equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person."'60
Stellings observes: "What is remarkable about the Ku Klux Klan Act is
its willingness to reach private conduct and its recognition that private
acts of terror threaten the public role of the citizen."61 As argued below,
gender-motivated violence denies the core concern of citizenship, bodily
security, and creates impediments to civic participation. The VAWA
recognizes this connection, as it must, to establish the legitimacy of a
civil rights remedy. A reading of the VAWA premised on citizenship
can give it a broad scope to address gender-motivated violence.
4. The Title III Remedy
The VAWA avoids many of the problems in current civil rights cases
by creating its own statutory right rather than relying upon rights
protected outside the statute. For example, in Carpenters the Court
refused to interpret § 1985(3) as encompassing conspiracies based on
"economic or commercial animus."62 It determined that such con-
spiracies are outside the bounds of the legislative history of § 1985(3) or
any subsequent congressional action. The Court added in Carpenters
that "If we have misconstrued the intent of the 1871 Congress, or, in
any event, if Congress now prefers to take a different tack, the Court
will, of course, enforce any statute within the power of Congress to
enact."63 Section 3oz(b) of the VAWA creates the federal right "to be
free from crimes of violence motivated by gender."64 The Carpenters
opinion said that "if § 1985(3) had itself created the rights in question
... instead of operating as a mere conduit for rights created elsewhere,
60. Stellings, supra note 57, at 211 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, reprinted in
KENNETH L. KAsT, BELONGING TO AMERIcA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CON-
STITUTION 50 (1989)).
61. Stellings, supra note 57, at 210.
62. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 838
(1983).
63. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 839.
64. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(b)(1993).
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Congress would have been clearly empowered to act against private
violence."65
Congress has rooted the VAWA's Constitutionality in the com-
merce clause66 and the Fourteenth Amendment. Arguments under the
latter identify gender-motivated violence as a citizenship question,
because women are denied equal protection of the laws through either
state action or state involvement. Professor Catharine MacKinnon
argues that, as currently applied, "[the equal protection clause is incon-
sistent with state law that promotes sex inequality. The law of sexual
assault commands Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny."67 If the VAWA
succeeds in creating full Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny for state
sexual abuse laws, women may have the possibility of "massive actions":
[Giving sexual abuse Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny] sup-
ports a constitutional appeal whenever a court engages in
judicial sexism in a sexual assault trial, a basis for massive civil
litigation under federal civil rights statutes for nonenforcement
and misenforcement of sexual assault laws on the basis of sex,
and a foundation for challenging the facial unconstitutionality
of biased state criminal laws that adopt a male perpetrator's
point of view to the systematic disadvantage of female vic-
65. Violence Against Women Hearing, supra note 5, at 99 (testimony by Burt Neuborne).
66. Under the commerce clause, Congress may regulate specific examples of a general
class of activity, noting the cumulative effect of similar local activities. Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971). So long as someone reasonable could find
that the legislation affected interstate commerce, courts will defer judgment.
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964).
The VAWA explicitly tries to connect gender-based violence with interstate
commerce. Section 302(a)(5) finds that this violence affects commerce "by deterring
potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in inter-
state business, and from transacting with business, and in places involved, in
interstate commerce." Section 302(a)(6) further finds that "gender-motivated
violence has a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, by diminishing
national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply
of and the demand for interstate products." The Senate Report cites, for example, a
study finding that "almost 50 percent of rape victims lose their jobs or are forced to
quit because of the crime's severity." S. Rep. No. 197, supra note 14, at 54 (citing
E. Ellis, B. Atkeson, & K. Calhoun, An Assessment of Long-Term Reaction to Rape, 90
J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL 264 (1981)). Within the commerce clause, the VAWA has
solid constitutional ground.
67. MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 1307. It is not just states' sexual assault laws that
MacKinnon believes promote sex inequality, as other laws may also perpetuate
women's inequality.
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tims. 68
MacKinnon contends that the complicity of the state, whether by the
acts of government officials or by its "criminal statutes and their inter-
pretation,"6 9 makes the law of sexual assault and the treatment of sexual
assault victims "government action"70 under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. She concludes that the law of sexual assault, by its terms and
enforcement, directly meets the more burdensome state action require-
ment, and therefore should be covered by the Fourteenth Amendment.
To use the Fourteenth Amendment, as the VAWA does, to address
gender-motivated violence committed by private individuals, Congress
must rely on some concept similar to MacKinnon's theory of state
complicity. One of the Fourteenth Amendment arguments advanced by
the Senate Report is that the VAWA "provides a 'necessary' remedy to
fill the gaps and rectify the biases of existing State laws."71 The Senate
Report argues that states have failed to provide equal protection of the
laws for women:
For example, [in] many States, rape survivors must overcome
barriers of proof and local prejudice that other crime victims
need not hurdle; they bear the burden of painful and prejudi-
cial attacks on their credibility that other crime victims do not
shoulder; they may be forced to expose their private life and
intimate conduct to win a damage award unlike any other
civil litigant; and, finally, in some cases, they are barred from
suit altogether by tort immunity doctrines and marital ex-
clusions. Moreover, since these burdens are disproportionately
borne by women, they should fail traditional standards for
scrutinizing gender discrimination. 72
The Senate Report advocates a "remedial" reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment, advocated by Professor Cass Sunstein.73
68. MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 1308.
69. MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 1307 n.117.
70. MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 1307.
71. S. Rep. No. 197, supra note 14, at 53.
72. S. Rep. No. 197, supra note 14, at 53-54.
73. Congress can exceed the self-executing provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment by
outlawing practices it finds to violate section 1. even if the courts have specifically
ruled that such practices do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. According to
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), "If the laws themselves make any unjust
discrimination ... Congress has full power to afford a remedy under that amend-
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Sunstein testified about an earlier version of the VAWA that "tide III
should be rewritten to emphasize legislative findings of equal protection
violations, instead of or as well as violations of the privileges and im-
munities clause."74 Including these findings "would make it altogether
unnecessary to ask the complex, controversial, and unresolved question
of whether section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to
reach purely private action."75 The current version of the VAWA con-
tains numerous findings indicating that violence against women is an
equal protection problem. Section 302(a) of the VAWA lists eight
specific Congressional findings, including:
(4) existing bias and discrimination in the criminal justice
system often deprives victims of gender-motivated crimes of
equal protection of the laws and the redress to which they are
entitled ... (7) a Federal civil rights action as specified in this
section is necessary to guarantee equal protection of the laws
ment and in accordance with it." Id. at 25. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966), the Court upheld a legislative ban on literacy tests for voting, though
the Supreme Court itself had not found such tests to be discriminatory. The Court
stated, "Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 651. This
substantive view permits Congress to define the content of the equal protection
clause.
Yet, Cass Sunstein warns that after Katzenbach a "majority of the Court has not
accepted this broad, substantive view of congressional power." Violence Against
Women Hearing, supra note 5, at 119 (testimony of Cass Sunstein). As such, he
argues against defending civil rights protection for gender-motivated violence with
the substantive view. Sunstein argues instead for a remedial reading of Congress'
power to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment, also developed in Katzenbach and
later used in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). In Rome, the
Court held that Congress could regulate discriminatory practices which themselves
might not violate the Constitution since they were not accompanied by dis-
criminatory intent. Id. at 173. According to the Court, "Congress could rationally
have concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable
history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful
discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact."
Id. at 173 (emphasis added). This is a weaker view than the substantive approach
because Congress tries to remedy situations the court would find to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, though it does so by legislating against a broad class of
actions, some of which might individually pass Constitutional muster. The Court
again uses a rational basis review to determine whether the legislation seeks to
correct demonstrable inequalities. Violence Against Women, supra note 5, at 119.
74. Violence Against Women Hearing, supra note 5, at 121-22 (testimony of Cass
Sunstein).
75. Violence Against Women Hearing, supra note 5, at 122 (testimony of Cass Sunstein).
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and to reduce the substantial adverse effects of gender-
motivated violence on interstate commerce; and (8) victims of
gender-motivated violence have a right to equal protection of
the laws, including a system 'of justice that is unaffected by
bias or discrimination and that, at every relevant stage, treats
such crimes as seriously as other violent crimes. 76
These findings should indicate sufficient state involvement to mollify
federal courts. As Sunstein casts the issue, "Congress is responding to
an equal protection problem in the administration of state and local law
by state and local governmental authorities."77 From a constitutional
standpoint, the question of purely private action therefore becomes
moot. He explains this convolution of constitutional law: "[The
Violence Against Women Act] is not responding to private acts at
all-no more than the equal protection clause itself does so by requir-
ing states to protect blacks as well as whites from private violence."'T
The "surface" problems with existing civil rights laws-the
statutory exclusion of gender, the requirement of conspiracy, and the
requirement of state involvement in private actions-are all solved by
the VAWA. But, simply adding gender may not be enough. The fact
that the institutions are so hostile to including gender is not an anoma-
ly or quaint bias of the 4 2d Congress; this hostility is an active force
that is a structural problem. By relying on these same institutions, those
who use the VAWA's civil rights provision may encounter unexpected
problems. More importantly, courts will still need to determine which
specific acts constitute gender-motivated violence that "strikes down the
citizen." To answer this question, the VAWA relies upon an analogy to
bias crimes.
B. The Gender Gap in Current Bias Crime Laws
The VAWA relies upon a bias violence model for its civil rights cause
of action. Indeed, the first legislative finding in title III is "crimes
motivated by the victim's gender constitute bias crimes in violation of
76. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(a)(1993).
77. Violence Against Women Hearing, supra note 5, at 122-23 (testimony of Cass
Sunstein).
78. Violence Against Women Hearing, supra note 5, at 122-23 (testimony of Cass
Sunstein).
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the victim's right to be free from discrimination on the basis of
gender." 79 The legislative history of the VAWA shows that it purports
to do nothing more than extend to women civil rights which others
already have. The Senate Report notes that title III "is modeled [on]
[T]itle VII, and 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, and 1985(3)," and extends similar
protections to private gender-based violence. 80 Each of these laws cur-
rently contributes to a gender gap in civil rights protection for violence
committed by private individuals. The Senate Report also notes that the
gender gap extends to state bias crime laws:
More recent legislation has not filled the 'gender gap' left by
traditional anti-bias crime laws. In the past IO years, almost
every State has passed laws that increase criminal penalties,
some of which also provide civil remedies for the victims of
hate crimes, but less than a dozen cover gender bias.81
In addition to state laws, the Congress itself passed the Hate Crimes
Statistics Act in 199 o , which requires "the collection of statistics on
crimes motivated by race, ethnicity, national origin, and sexual orienta-
tion" but not on crimes motivated by gender.82
To remedy these gaps, the VAWA recognizes gender-motivated
violence as a bias crime: "Placing this violence in the context of the
civil rights laws recognizes it for what it is-a hate crime."83 The
Senate Report justifies including gender-motivated crimes as bias
violence because the result is often the same as recognized forms of hate
violence:
Whether the attack is motivated by racial bias, ethnic bias, or
gender bias, the results are often the same. The victims of
such violence are reduced to symbols of hatred; they are
chosen not because of who they are as individuals but because
of their class status. The violence not only wounds physically,
it degrades and terrorizes, instilling fear and inhibiting the
lives of all those similarly situated.8 4
79. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 302(a)(1)(1993).
80. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 64.
81. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 48.
82. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 48.
83. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 49 (quoting Violence Against Women Hearing,
supra note 5 (testimony of Burt Neuborne)).
84. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 49.
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The problem with this understanding, regardless of its actual merit as a
psychological or sociological description of gender-motivated violence, is
that it limits a plaintiff's ability to prevail in a civil rights action. An
individual woman, for example, must prove that she is a representative
of all women. In acquaintance situations, especially in "domestic"
situations, proving that one was selected for an attack as a representative
of one's entire gender will prove a nearly impossible burden. While
trying to understand gender-motivated violence, the VAWA's authors
have unwittingly adopted the gendered logic that permeates model bias
crime statutes. As discussed below, some of the results of gender-
motivated violence are the same as racially-motivated violence against
men, but the processes are not the same.
This section examines the development of the model bias crime
and argues that its exclusion of gender reflects a gendered structural
logic of the model. The model of a bias crime-developed to address
the reality of racially- and religiously-motivated violence that occurs
against men in public spaces-is gendered because it does not con-
ceptualize a common experience shared by women. Women are not a
group under the classic model because their experiences are atomized
into millions of individual private experiences of beatings, abuse, and
humiliation-often behind closed doors-which never rise to the level
of a recognizable group experience.
Legislative attempts to extend additional protection to victims of
discriminatory violent attacks have resulted in a body of bias, or hate,
crime laws. These laws, enacted in varying forms by forty-seven states,
usually enhance criminal penalties for already punishable crimes when
they are motivated by discriminatory intent. Many jurisdictions also
include a civil rights cause of action for private individuals victimized
by this violence. The best example of the penalty-enhancement scheme
is the enormously influential Anti-Defamation League (ADL) model
hate crime statute, enacted partially or fully in thirty-one states and the
model for the federal Hate Crimes Statistics Act.8 5 According to the
model statute:
A person commits the crime of intimidation if, by reason of
the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin or
sexual orientation of another individual or group of in-
dividuals, he violates [the Penal Code provision(s) for criminal
85. Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (codified as 28
U.S.C.A. § 534 (1990)).
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trespass, criminal mischief, harassment, menacing, assault
and/or other appropriate statutorily proscribed criminal con-
duct] .86
The model statute allows individual states to augment penalties for
crimes committed with discriminatory intent.
The most striking feature of the model statute, and most state
statutes, is the omission of gender. Though the ADL cites no official
reason for excluding gender as a protected category, a policy back-
ground report suggests possible reasons that may have influenced the
final decision.8 7 The most important reason is that violence motivated
by gender does not fit the classic hate crime scenario.
The ADL's background report asserts many reasons both for and
against including gender. The following passage argues against inclusion-
the position that the ADL adopted:
[A] substantial majority of women victims of violent crimes
were previously acquainted with their attackers. While a hate
crime against a black sends a message to all blacks, the same
logic does not follow in many sexual assaults. Victims are not
necessarily "interchangeable" in the same way; in cases of
marital rape or date rape for example, the relationship
between individual perpetrator and victim is the salient
fact-whether the defendant is a woman-hater in general is
irrelevant. Furthermore, sentencing alternatives other than a
stepped-up penalty may be preferable in situations when the
perpetrator is also the family's breadwinner .... Since sexual
assault crimes are reprehensible under any circumstances, ADL
should not seek to make distinctions. Urging law enforcement
officials to look for additional evidence of a misogynist motive
in cases of domestic violence is not only impractical; it serves
86. LEGAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RiTH, HATE
CRIMES STATUTES: A 1991 STATUS REPORT 4 (1991).
87. Steven M. Freeman, Civil Rights Division Policy Background Report, Hate Crimes
Statutes: Including Women as Victims (1990) (unpublished internal document of
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, on file with author). This document is not
an official statement of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith's position. It is
an internal document with arguments for and against including gender, provided as
a courtesy for background information and should be understood as informing the
ADL's debate. This document is important because arguments for excluding gender
from hate crime laws have rarely been made so explicit. It is difficult to criticize the
exclusion of gender when the real reasons are never made public.
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no useful purpose. Such cases simply do not fit the traditional
hate crime scenario. Consequently, rather than trying to
modify the definition to accommodate domestic violence and
other circumstances which cannot neatly be accommodated,
the model statute should remain unchanged.... While some
law enforcement officials might dismiss incidents of anti-Semi-
tic vandalism as pranks in the absence of hate crimes legisla-
tion, there is no comparable danger when it comes to sexual
assaults. 88
The ADL's background report makes four major assumptions. First,
that certain violence against one woman does not send a message to
many, if not all, women. Second, that the violence is not based on
hatred of women in general (or that it isn't necessary to look for addi-
tional motivation). Third, that sexual assaults are already taken serious-
ly. Finally, that the categories and the violence cannot neatly be accom-
modated. This final assumption relies upon a public model of bias
violence that most clearly identifies the theoretical subject of the
model's protection as male.
The ADL's position paper makes the untenable assertion that
gender-motivated violence against women does not send a message to
all women. The threat of violence determines the bounds of where and
when women may work, live, and study. Women fear for their safety
and curtail their activities based on this fear.89 The irony of women
establishing their safety by restricting their movements in public is that
"women are most at risk with their intimate partners or friends." 90
88. Freeman, supra note 87, at 12-13. Arguments not presented in the document may
have crucially shaped the debate, though Mr. Freeman indicated that these reasons,
not necessarily in this form, seemed to be the most persuasive. Telephone Interview
with Steven M. Freeman, Director of ADL's Legal Affairs Department (Nov. 24,
1992). Mr. Freeman also added one argument not mentioned in the quoted ex-
cerpt: that including gender would be overwhelming because of the sheer number of
cases. One can read this argument as either saying that the symbolic value of
prosecutions in non-gender cases will be overshadowed, if not lost, were gender
included, or that the justice system would be overburdened by such a dramatic
number of cases. Either way, the argument is an implicit concession that women arc
so pervasively abused that we should not deal with it through this legal ac-
tion-strange how the success of feminism in exposing the extent of abuse against
women is being used as a reason not to protect women.
89. See MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR (1989).
90. CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN As BIAS
MOTIVATED HATE CRIME: DEFINING THE ISSUES 2 (1991).
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According to Charlotte Bunch, systematic fear of violence deprives
women of political power and the ability to participate in society:
Contrary to the argument that such violence is only personal
or cultural, it is profoundly political. It results from the struc-
tural relationships of power, domination, and privilege
between men and women in society. Violence against women
is central to maintaining these political relations at home, at
work, and in all public spheres. 91
The ADL report removes gender-motivated violence from its well-
documented social context when it argues that violence against women
is not based at least in part on misogyny. In addition, the ADL report
unwittingly accepts an implicit male ownership of women. A Center for
Women Policy Studies report responds to the ADL report's argument
by stating:
[T]he suggestion that "the relationship" or acquaintanceship
between victim and perpetrator is "the salient fact" and that
"whether the defendant is a woman-hater in general is ir-
relevant" assumes the legitimacy of male ownership and
domination of women. The notion that violence committed
by an acquaintance or partner cannot, by definition, be
motivated in major part by woman-hating in general ignores
the reality of these crimes against women. 92
The ADL report further argues that since "sexual assault crimes are
reprehensible under any circumstances," it is not necessary to look for
additional motivation. Doing so, according to the ADL report, simply
"serves no useful purpose." While all sexual assaults may be gender-
motivated crimes, it is not true that all gender-motivated crimes are
sexual assaults. Moreover, the ADL most probably views lynching and
neo-Nazi violence as "reprehensible under any circumstances," yet must
believe that singling out such crimes does serve some useful purpose.93
91. CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 90, at 3 (quoting Charlotte
Bunch, Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-vision of Human Rights, 12
HUM. RTS. Q. 486 (1990)).
92. CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 90, at 13. The ADL report does
not explain why the relationship is the salient feature. They seem to conflate the
staggering number of acts of gender-motivated violence committed by acquaintances
with the motivation for the violence.
93. Perhaps the ADL assumes that singling out certain crimes for special attention
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serves no useful purpose because legislatures, when they drafted their penal codes,
properly contemplated the harm of the crimes and created appropriate sanctions.
Professor Mark Kelman poses a similar concern when analyzing penalty enhance-
ment statutes: "[I]f the goal of the proposed revision of criminal law is augmenta-
tion of penalties for acts already criminalized, then the specific act must violate not
just the interest initially contemplated in the general law ... but some interest
violated only in some sub-class of identifiable cases." Letter from Mark Kelman,
Professor of Law, Stanford University Law School, to David Frazee (Aug. 11,
1993). Hence, if all rape and domestic violence oppresses women, then one cannot
justly or rationally single out some cases for special punishment. The better legisla-
tive response is to punish all rape and domestic violence at a level that adequately
reflects their harm. Especially in the criminal law, such an approach would better
protect the principle of legality and streamline trials.
But what exactly is "the interest initially contemplated in the general law?"
Kelman offers, as an example, that "rape law might protect both autonomy-as
'traditionalists' would argue-and gender equality." Kelman, supra. It seems likely
that in the case of rape, however, neither interest was contemplated. Historically,
the Anglo-American law of rape derives from men's ownership of women and
continues to reflect vestiges of this heritage. In addition, rarely do American
criminal laws contemplate an explicit interest in equality. Though the enforcement
of criminal laws may serve the ends of procedural or substantive equality, legisla-
tures usually justify crimes with theories of specific deterrence, general deterrence,
rehabilitation, assaultive retribution, vengeance, societal retaliation, forfeiture,
denunciation, education, or restraint. See JosHuA DRESSIER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAw § 2 (1987); WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AuSTIN W. Scowr, JR., CRIMINAL
LAw § 1.5 (2d ed. 1986).
Over the last two decades, feminists have emphasized women's equality as a
reason to reform rape laws, though it is not clear that legislatures acted for this
reason. If they did, they probably did not understand equality the same way the
reformers did. Next, even if legislatures contemplated the harm in rape fully, one
cannot separate the statutes on the books from the practice of their enforcement
and their social meaning. Patterns of prejudice in the judicial system impair careful-
ly crafted criminal laws. See JEANNE C. MARCH, ALIsON GEIsT & NATHAN CAPLAN,
RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAw REFORM (1982) (study of the 1975 Michigan rape
law reform); Wallace Loh, The Impact of Common Law and Reform Rape Statutes on
Prosecution: An Empirical Study, 55 WASH. L. REv. 543 (1980).
Furthermore, it makes a difference how one justifies, labels, and apportions
punishment. Simply saying that a certain form of rape carries a penalty of ten years
in prison is not the same as saying that the same rape carries a penalty, for example,
of seven years imprisonment for traditional criminal justice reasons and an addition-
al three years for oppressing women. It is precisely the role of legislative bodies to
make these determinations, especially when earlier efforts mischaracterized or
contributed to the harm inflicted by the crime. Finally, while all rapes and domestic
violence might be gender-motivated violence, not all gender-motivated violence
consists of these crimes. Not all kidnapping. for example, is gender-motivated,
though some is and should be punished more severely because of it. It is important
not to equate crimes committed because of sex with sex crimes. In any event, the
existence of a criminal penalty, even if fully appropriate for the gravity of the crime
committed, does not eliminate the need for a civil rights remedy for gender-
motivated violence.
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The ADL report assumes that the justice system treats gender-
motivated crimes seriously. The report endows police officers and other
personnel affiliated with the judicial system with unprecedented
sensitivity to sexual assault and other gender-motivated acts despite
evidence to the contrary. For example, even the Senate Report finds
cwidespread gender bias in the courts, particularly in cases of rape and
domestic violence." 94 The Senate Report states:
Judges, juries, prosecutors, and police officers... may require
a woman: to have physical injuries; to tell a consistent story;
to be willing to take a lie detector test, to not have waited for
more than 48 hours before reporting the incident, to not have
engaged in premarital or extramarital sex, to have had no
previous social contact with her assailant, and not to have
reached the location of the rape voluntarily.95
All of these factors make the victim's behavior, rather than the attack-
er's, the focus of the judicial proceeding. In a domestic battering
relationship in which the victim did not flee her home, the question
often becomes "Why did she stay?" instead of "Why did he abuse?"
Judges and juries may demand corroborating evidence, though it is not
required in the law, or they may disbelieve victims of sexual assault
more than victims of other crimes. 96
Whether a hate crime law creates additional criminal penalties or a civil rights
remedy, it performs the socially useful function of labeling the harm caused by the
violence. Civil rights laws are an appropriate forum for identifying the forms of
oppression we want to attack, especially when state laws, in practice or theory,
contribute to the inequality. More is at stake than simply a functional concern
about potentially overlapping remedies or how legislatures define social harm by
creating penalties for broad classes of crimes. The denial of a civil rights remedy for
victims of gender-motivated violence--especially when few other effective options
exist-sends a dear message that these victims are not worthy of societal concern.
In addition to the direct act itself, the harm of the crime may include an infringe-
ment of the political or social equality of the victim. So-called bias crimes have a
greater effect than simply the effect on the direct victims. Violent acts against
women often affect individual lives and a group of lives for whom the violence has
palpable social consequences, such as the fear of experiencing the same violence.
94. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 44.
95. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 45-46.
96. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 45 (citing FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER ISSUES IN THE COURTS; ILLINOIS TASK
FORCE, GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 99 (1990); COLORADO SUPREME COURT TASK
FORcE ON GENDER Bus IN THE COURTS, GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COLORADO
COURTS 91 (1990)).
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Criminal statutes, even hate crimes statutes, are not an adequate
substitute for civil rights legislation though they can function well in
conjunction with each other. Victims do not have control over hate
crimes prosecutions any more than they do over other criminal proceed-
ings. When gender is included in hate crime laws, they may not help
victims of gender-motivated violence because judges and juries embody
the same attitudes reflected in the ADL's report or because of the
structural reasons discussed below. Also, the wide variation of available
remedies among states argues for the necessity of a federal civil rights
remedy. State laws cannot create a national standard of anti-discrimina-
tion or equality. More importantly, biases in state laws, as well as the
administration of justice which deny equal rights to women, create a
compelling reason for a federal remedy.
The notion of group violence enshrined in the ADL's model hate
crime statute most clearly reflects the gendered logic behind the law. In
the ADL model hate crime, an attacker, or attackers, express hatred for
a racial or religious group through the random selection of one par-
ticular member of that group to suffer violence. Rather than modify the
model, expand the model, make the model conditional upon varying
circumstances, or abandon the model, the ADL codified it to the ex-
clusion of many crimes that should be covered-the vast majority of
bias crimes-which "cannot neatly be accommodated."
No good reasons exist to exclude gender from bias crime legisla-
tion. However, since the exclusion is no mere oversight, adding gender
to the list of protected categories does not guarantee that such laws will
adequately address gender-motivated violence. The likely result of
simply adding gender is that laws so modified will cover only gender-
motivated violence that looks like racially- or religiously-motivated
violence that occurs primarily against men. 97 The reason the model
97. Violence against women of color receives little or no attention in civil rights analysis
because the harms that "matter" occur against men. The Klan often directed its
violence during the Reconstruction at black women, a fact known to the Congress.
According to one witness, women feared the Klan "[b]ecause men that voted radical
tickets they took the spite out on the women when they could get at them." Stell-
ings, supra note 57, at 211 n.118 (citing BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA: A
DOcUMENTARY HISTORY 183 (Gerda Lerner ed., 1973) (quoting testimony of
Harriet Hernandez before the Joint Congressional Committee)). Another woman
related the story:
[A]fter while they took me out of doors and told me all they wanted was
my old man to join the democratic ticket; if he joined the democratic
ticket they would have no more to do with him; and after they had got
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cannot neatly accommodate gender is because the model structurally
labels violence against women as private.
C. Three Public-Private Splits
The model bias crime and model civil rights violation dichotomize
violence along a number of private-public axes. Since only public
violence merits the heightened legal remedy contemplated by civil rights
doctrines, these dichotomies are hierarchical. A "private" label attached
to an act of violence carries with it the judgment that it is a lesser
crime, not worthy of the same degree of public protection.
1. The Location of the Violence
The first dichotomy concerns the location of the violence. Most often,
violence that occurs in the "home" is private, while violence that occurs
outside the "home" is public. This is not a surprising dichotomy, given
the historical evolution of public laws of male ownership of property,
including women, and the development of privacy doctrine. 98 Legal
scholars such as Andrea Brenneke contend that civil rights should be
extended to groups such as battered women because "the philosophical
tradition of American liberal government supports an argument that
civil rights of battered women must be recognized and protected, lest
me out of doors, they dragged me out into the big road, and they
ravished me there.
Stellings, supra note 57, at 21 n. 118 (quoting Harriet Smirl). Sometimes, violence
against women of color becomes a political issue, but rarely on its own terms.
Professor Kimberle Crenshaw has written that "[tlo the extent rape of Black women
is thought to dramatize racism, it is usually cast as an assault on Black manhood,
demonstrating his inability to protect Black women. The direct assault on Black
womanhood is less frequently seen as an assault on the Black community."
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1273 (1991).
98. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 973 (1991).
Schneider argues that:
The concept of freedom from state intrusion into the marital bedroom
takes on a different meaning when it is violence that goes on in the
marital bedroom. The concept of marital privacy ... historically has been
the key ideological rationale for state refusal to intervene to protect
battered women .... [This is] the dark and violent side of privacy.
Schneider, supra at 974.
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the foundation of democratic government itself, the social contract, lose
all legitimacy." 99 Brenneke's argument assumes that all citizens, through
the social contract, gain civil rights protected by the state in exchange
for giving up their natural rights, protected through self-enforcement. 100
According to Brenneke, women "regardless of their legal relationship [to
men], also possess [the natural rights of self-preservation]." 10 1 Brenneke
blames the failure of law to protect women on the "privatized" institu-
tion of the family:
Although social contract theory establishes that the husband
has no right to infringe on the person of the wife with
violence that might lead to death, the state's historical
"privatization" of the family has provided the theoretical
rationale of non-intervention and non-enforcement of wives'
civil rights when deprived by husbands through domestic
violence .... It is time that notions of "civil rights" be
brought into the so-called "private" realm of the family to end
the violent state of nature left by non-enforcement of the
laws.102
The problem with the law, according to this account, is that women
have been denied agency and protection from the state of their rights.
Since much gender-motivated violence occurs behind millions of
closed doors, it is shielded from the same public scrutiny as most
racially and religiously motivated violence. The authors of the ADL
model had in mind a specific type of violence that often occurs outside
the "home." The places in which anti-Semitic or racist attacks take
place, for example, are not always the same places in which misogynist
attacks take place. The historical experiences of oppression have dif-
fered. Because of these differences, the drafters of the ADL statute may
simply not recognize women as having a group identity at all. One
important difference between racism and sexism is that the division of
social space between women and men which differs from that between
different races and religious groups. Women, for example, often live
with men.103 Though difficult to document, when the drafters of the
99. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 19.
100. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 18.
ioi. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 19.
102. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 22.
103. I would argue that American slavery may have taken on some of the discourses of
private violence because the infantilization and ownership of blacks reduced them to
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ADL statute picture anti-Semitic violence, they likely imagine a burning
synagogue or a violent attack on a Jewish man on a public sidewalk,
not a Jewish woman attacked in her own home. According to Stellings,
"Those who stress too much that aspect of citizenship involving politi-
cal participation omit the importance of the private world of family and
the impact of self-ownership on public governance." 10 4 Violence that
occurs in traditionally private space has no less an invidious effect on
civil rights than violence in public space.
Historically, women's social space is, by definition, private, which
makes this public-private division uniquely harmful to women. Carole
Pateman writes, "In a world presented as conventional, contractual and
universal, women's civil position is ascriptive, defined by the natural
particularity of being women; patriarchal subordination is socially and
legally upheld throughout civil life, in production and citizenship as
well as in the family."105 Women do not possess the ability to consent
and are, by definition, part of the private realm, shielded from state
protection, and vulnerable to men's force:106
The "natural foundation" of civil society has been brought
into being through the fraternal social contract. The separa-
tion of "paternal" from political rule, or the family from the
public sphere, is also the separation of women from men
through the subjugation of women to men .... The fraternal
social contract creates a new, modern patriarchal order that is
presented as divided into two spheres: civil society or the
universal sphere of freedom, equality, individualism, reason,
contract and impartial law-the realm of men or "in-
dividuals"; and the private world of particularity, natural
subjugation, ties of blood, emotion, love and sexual pas-
sion-the world of women, in which men also rule.107
The decision to value traditionally defined public crimes over private
ones has the effect of excluding from civil rights protection most
violence that occurs against women.
a similar status as women and children-they were both the property and quasi-
family of the slave owner, protected from outside legal interference. They were part
of the "home."
1o4. Stellings, supra note 57, at 209.
105. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE Dison.DER OF WOMEN 52 (1989).
106. PATEMAN, supra note 105, at 52.
107. PATEMAN, supra note 105, at 43.
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2. Relationship Between the Parties
The second dichotomy concerns the nature of the relationship between
the attacker and the victim. The ADL concentrates great theoretical
efforts on distinguishing randomly selected victims, who have no prior
acquaintance with their attackers, from personally selected victims who
have some relationship. This dichotomy suggests that certain types of
relationships matter more than others. "Public" business or professional
relationships do not diminish the nature of hate crimes, while "private"
ones do. Somehow, "in cases of marital rape or date rape . . . the
relationship between individual perpetrator and victim is the salient
fact." 10 8 Under the ADL report's analysis, by choosing to marry or go
on a date, a woman forfeits all civil rights remedies against her partner.
Any violence that occurs, by definition, must be private in nature-as if
a woman consents to violence when she agrees to go on a date. This
division perpetuates the systematic violence already done to victims of
gender-motivated acts, for a victim's acquaintance with her or his
attacker, however slight, substantially diminishes the chances that the
incident will be viewed as a crime 09 and most times ensures that the
victim will be blamed for the incident. 110 This is especially troublesome
108. Freeman, supra note 87, at 12.
109. For an excellent summary of the myths that work against rape victims in the legal
system, as well as a summary of the empirical data refuting each myth, see Lynn
Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading About Rape: A Primer, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
979, 985 (1993) ("A great many people.., do not realize that sexual penetration
achieved by force and against the victim's will is rape and a criminal act .. .when
the parties are nonstrangers."). Schafran emphasizes that even victims may not label
their attacks rape when the perpetrator is an acquaintance, citing a study of 3,187
female students on 32 college campuses. Schafran, supra, at 1014 (citing Mary P.
Koss et al., Stranger and Acquaintance Rape, 12 PSYCHOL. VOMEN Q. 1, 4 (1988))
(489 of the sample had been forced to engage in sexual activity that met the legal
definition of rape, but only 57% labelled their experience rape). See also RoIN
WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE (1988) (discussing why people, including
victims, believe that sexual violence committed by acquaintances is not really rape).
110. See generally EsriucH, supra note 7, at 27-79; Schafran, supra note 109, at 984-
1026; WAasHtw, supra note 109, at 24-35. In general, we attribute guilt to victims
and adopt blaming myths to shift the burden for violence onto those who suffer it.
Experimental data demonstrates that "People tend to condemn an apparently
blameless victim to reassert their belief in a just world and to lessen cognitive
dissonance." Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REv. 751,
759 n.24 (discussing M. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL
DELUSION 50 (1980)). According to Sunstein, "[B]eneficiaries of the status quo"
tend to conclude "that the victims deserve their fate, that they are responsible for it,
or that the current situation is part of an intractable, given, or natural order."
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since most acts of gender-motivated violence are committed by acquain-
tances. 1 Brenneke argues that victims' internalization of these attitudes
may prevent some from understanding violence that occurs against
them as gender-motivated: "Because abusers are known intimately by
their victims and the violence appears particularized, [t]itle III plaintiffs
will have to overcome the impulse to presume violence towards them is
personal animosity and not gender motivated action."11 2 The relation-
ship of a victim of gender-motivated violence to an attacker diminishes
the gravity of the violence though blaming myths, disbelief, and stigma.
In these ways, the violence is made personal, individual, and private.
3. The Nature of the Violence
The third dichotomy concerns the nature of the violence itself. As
Stellings has observed, the idea that physical violence and coercion
deprives rights and liberty usually meets little opposition:
The idea that we are granted rights in our own bodies seems
so fundamental that references to a right to be free from
physical coercion are usually made fleetingly because the
speaker does not anticipate disagreement. Thus, in the
Reconstruction-era case Munn v. Illinois, Justice Field at-
tempted to define the liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment
as "something more ... than mere freedom from physical
restraint. . . ." Justice Field assumed that the Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed, at the very least, freedom from
physical restraint. Later, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court used
Sunstein, supra at 759.
I I. For data on rape, see Schafran, supra note 109, at 984 (the vast majority of rapes
are committed by someone know to the victim) (reviewing data in CRIME VICTIMS
RESEARCH AND TREATMENT CENTER, RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION
5 (1992)); MASSACHusETrS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY COM-
MITrEE, GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE COURT SYSTEM IN MASSACHUSETTS 100
(1989); Report of the Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force on Gender Fairness in the
Courts, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 829, 895 (1989). For data on domestic
violence, see MAJORITY STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102D CONG.,
2D SESS., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA 3 (Comm.
Print 1992) ("Some experts estimate that a woman has between a 1-in-3 and a 1-in-
5 chance of being physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during her lifetime;
total domestic violence, reported and unreported, affects as many as 4 million
women a year.") (citations omitted).
112. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 76-77.
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the definition of liberty as "freedom from bodily restraint" as
a baseline concession with which all could agree.1 13
However, such agreements have not been so easy in the case of gender-
motivated violence, such as sexual violence: "Liberal legal culture has
failed women in its obstinate refusal to recognize certain harms because
they are different, or privately inflicted. Problems like sexual violence
are a misfortune and only actionable to the extent that they are like
other crimes of violence." 114 In short, the law draws a distinction
between sexual violence and other crimes of violence.
Such a distinction is made by Professor John Ladd in his article
entitled "The Idea of Collective Violence." 115 In it, he distinguishes
"private violence" from "collective violence," which he defines as "the
kind of violence that is practiced by one group on another and that
pertains to individuals, as agents or as victims, only by virtue of their
(perceived) association with a particular group." 116 For Ladd, violence
against women is not collective violence:
[Collective violence] is quite unlike private violence, for ex-
ample, domestic violence or street violence, in which the vic-
tims are selected by the attacker because of some relationship
the attacker has to the victim or because of something about
the victim that makes him or her a desirable target, such as
having money or being a woman (rape). Except in unusual or
bizarre cases, and making the usual necessary allowances for
borderline cases, group membership (e.g., in a racial or
religious group) is not the sole or the crucial factor, as it is
with collective violence." 7
What distinguishes rape and robbery from collective violence for Ladd
is the object of each crime, which Ladd sees as partly instrumental.118
Just as robbery has an instrumental value, the acquisition of goods or
money, rape has a reason: sex. To repeat Ladd's argument:
113. Stellings, supra note 57, at 213 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142 (1876)
(Field, J., dissenting); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
114. Stellings, supra note 57, at 215.
115. John Ladd, The Idea of Collective Violence, in JUsTICE, LAW & VIOLENCE 19 (James
B. Brady & Newton Carver eds., 1991).
116. Ladd, supra note 115, at 19.
117. Ladd, supra note 115, at 22 (emphasis added).
118. Ladd, supra note 115, at 22.
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"[S]omething about the victim makes ... her a desirable target, such
as... being a woman (rape)."' 19 Rape is not irrational, ideological, ran-
dom violence. Rather, rape is the expression of a natural impulse of
desire. The mere fact that a woman is a woman makes her a desirable
target for rape. By Ladd's analysis, to be a woman is to be "rapeable."
Ladd's analysis begs the question: for whom are women a desirable
target of rape? Presumably, the answer is heterosexual men. 'Whether
the nature of gender-motivated violence is indeed private and in-
dividual, except in "unusual or bizarre cases," depends upon whose
perspective one adopts. This problem of perspectives mirrors the defini-
tion of the crime of rape, in which the harm of the act is defined by
the meaning of the act to the victim, but the criminality is defined by
the meaning of the act to the attacker. Catharine MacKinnon has
identified this dichotomy in rape law as a subject-object split. 120
Rape is only an injury from women's point of view. It is only
a crime from the male point of view, explicitly including that
of the accused .... [Tihe man's perceptions of the woman's
desires determine whether she is deemed violated .... With
rape, because sexuality defines gender norms, the only dif-
ference between assault and what is socially defined as a non-
injury is the meaning of the encounter to the woman. Inter-
preted this way, the legal problem has been to determine
whose view of that meaning constitutes what really happened,
as if what happened objectively exists to be objectively
determined .... [R]ape law ... uniformly presumes a single
underlying reality, rather than a reality split by the divergent
meanings that inequality produces. Many women are raped by
men who know the meaning of their acts to the victim
perfectly well and proceed anyway. But women are also vio-
lated everyday by men who have no idea of the meaning of
their acts to the women. To them it is sex. Therefore, to the
law it is sex. That becomes the single reality of what hap-
pened.' 2 '
A woman may feel that she was raped, while a man feels that he has
119. Ladd, supra note 115, at 22 (emphasis added).
120. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State:
Towards Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNs 635 (1983).
121. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 180
(1989).
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engaged in sex. However, the legal solution is to "conclude that a rape
did not happen."122 Women may perceive the experiences of rape shared
by so many victims as collective violence or bias violence. On the other
hand, men may perceive this same phenomenon as millions of sexual
encounters, some of which, as determined on a case-by-case basis, may
not have been consensual and hence, at most, instances of personal
violence. As summarized by MacKinnon, "The one whose subjectivity
becomes the objectivity of 'what happened' is a matter of social mean-
ing, that is, a matter of sexual politics." 123 Under this analysis, gender-
motivated violence is private because legal ideologies define it that way.
The existence of these ideologies provides a powerful justification for
the VAWA, though judges may rely on them to undermine the Act's
effectiveness. If VAWA defendants' perceptions can define whether
gender motivated their actions, then VAWA plaintiffs will rarely prevail.
Like Ladd's argument, the ADL's model statute excludes gender
entirely, precluding as a bias crime all violence against women based on
their gender, no matter how public the act, or how much the violence
reflects selection of women as objects of misogyny. Even the killing of
fourteen women engineering students in Montreal by Marc Lepine
would not count as a hate crime, though Lepine, declaring his desire to
"kill the feminists," separated the women from the men in the
classroom before opening fire with a 22-caliber automatic rifle while
shouting "you're all fucking feminists." 124 The ADL background report
even cites this incident in its section that lists reasons for including
gender, commenting, "It is hard to imagine a crime which fits the
classic model of a 'hate crime' any better." 125
122. MacKinnon, supra note 120, at 654.
123. MAcKINNON, supra note 121, at 183.
124. Freeman, supra note 87, at 7.
125. Freeman, supra note 87, at 7. Since it would have been so easy to include gender in
the statute, but limit its application to these extreme "classic" situations, a desire to
protect the purity of the model seems less credible as the motivation than the
disturbing disinterest in the systematic violence committed against women.
It is ironic that an organization founded as a response to the vicious and brutal
murder of Leo Frank, a Jewish northern-bred supervisor in Georgia in 1913 lynched
by a group of prominent male citizens for the rape and murder of a 13-year-old
female worker in his factory, should offer these arguments. Under the ADL model
and the arguments above, Leo Frank's case might not be considered a hate crime.
See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. Though the lynch mob's actions
undoubtedly sent a message to all Jews, Leo Frank was not at all "interchangeable."
The case would not have generated attention, nor would he have been lynched,
without his status in the community, his particular history, and the peculiar cir-
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Rather than include gender only in the cases in which it does fit
the narrow hate crime model -which would be problematic since the
ADL does not support limiting application of racially- or religiously-
motivated hate crimes statutes only to situations that fit the "randomly
selected" model-the ADL chose not to include gender at all. The
practical effect of its decision to exclude gender is to endorse Ladd's
reasoning that hate crimes against women do not matter. Though the
ADL's primary mission is to combat anti-Semitism, not misogyny, its
decision to exclude gender seriously disadvantages, for example, Jewish
women who might need the protection that a comprehensive statute
and integrated approach would afford, especially given the difficulty of
separating multiple motivations for a crime. The ADL also sacrifices
important connections between sexism and the forms of violence its
model statute covers, undermining the potential effectiveness of its
statute and much of the moral force it might otherwise claim-
It is neither accidental nor a mere oversight that the ADL chose to
exclude gender from its nationwide effort to enact bias crime legislation;
its theoretical conception of who deserves protection is based on a male
bias crime model. The distinction between crimes that count and
crimes that do not, in this scheme, is explicitly gendered. Gender-based
violence by definition is not a hate crime because the systematic nature
of the violence is dissolved into unrelated "private" incidents.
cumstances of the case. See Nancy McLean, The Leo Frank Case Reconsidered:
Gender and Sexual Politics in the Making of Reactionary Populism, J. Am. HAST. 917,
947 (1991) ("[Ihe Frank case could never have incited the passions it did without
changes in female behavior and family relations as the context, and without the
charged issue of sexuality and power between the sexes and generations as the
trigger."). See also LEONARD DINNERsTEiN, THE LEo FRANK CASE (1968); Clement
Charlton Moseley, The Case of Leo M Frank, 1913-1915, 51 GA. HisT. Q. 42
(1967).
Many hate crime cases only make sense because of a prior acquaintance between
the parties involved, especially in status relationships such as employment and
education. One interesting case, cited by the ADL itself in its 1992 litigation
docket, for which it filed an amicus brief, is State of Florida v. Dobbins, No. 91-
1953 (Florida 5th District Court of Appeal). LEGAL AFFAIRs DEPARTMENT, ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAi B'Rrr, ADL IN THE CouRTs: LITIGATION DocKET
1992, at 34 (1992) ("[F]ive members of a racist skinhead group . .. were charged
with attempted first degree murder .... for attacking a 17-year-old fellow skinhead,
in October 1990, when they discovered that he was Jewish.").
Just as the prior acquaintances Leo Frank might have had with persons who
conspired to effect his lynching should not diminish the horror and nature of the
incident, neither should the prior acquaintance of a victim of sexual assault or any
other gender-motivated act lessen the impact of the incident.
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D. The Dangers of Adding Gender to the Models
Rather than use pretextual judgments about which types of violence
matter-which is done by dichotomizing violence as public or
private-one should examine the empirical reality of what violence
occurs, where it occurs, and what harms result. The resulting informa-
tion should help determine what constitutes gender-motivated violence,
how to identify it, and how to remedy it. Instead, the VAWA's authors
have chosen to rely on a simplistic analogy of gender-motivated violence
to racially-motivated violence. In addition, they have chosen simplistic
examples of gender-motivated violence that embody extreme stereotypes.
In the process, they ignore the everyday reality of violence against
women.
The Senate Report on the Violence Against Women Act of 1993126
contains two model crimes to illustrate the situations to which the civil
rights remedy should apply. No doubt, many judges will look to these
examples as the measure of cases that come before them. The first
begins with an example of a case of a racially motivated attack:
Consider a case where a black civil rights worker is beaten by
an avowed white supremacist who has terrorized a
predominantly African-American neighborhood. To prove at
trial that the attack was "motivated by racial bias," the vic-
tim's lawyers will put into evidence the circumstances that
demonstrate the bias: that the victim was of one race (African-
American) and the attacker was of another (white); that the
attacker does not typically assault white people and has a
history of assaulting African-American people; that the attack-
er belonged to a white supremacist organization; and that the
attacker shouted racial epithets during the assault. None of
these circumstances taken individually is required to prove
that the attack was racially motivated, but taken together
these factors may show racial bias.
Gender-motivated crimes should be viewed in precisely
the same way. Consider the case of a serial rapist who shouts
misogynist slurs as he attacks his victims. A victim's lawyer
would prove exactly the same type of evidence that the lawyer
in the "race" case proved: that the victim was of a particular
126. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11.
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sex; that the attacker had a long history of attacking persons
of that sex, but not those of the opposite sex; and that the
attacker shouted antiwoman (or man) epithets during the
assault. Bias, in short, can be proven by circumstantial as well
as indirect evidence. Again, the jury might not be convinced
by any one of these circumstances individually-but could
conclude that, taken together, they show gender bias. 127
According to the Report, the totality of circumstances must con-
vince the factfinder, whether judge or jury, that the act was motivated
by gender. The Senate Report further argues that a woman cannot
claim a civil rights violation merely because she was a woman and was
harmed; the woman must prove a sex-based animus in order to
establish a civil rights violation. To illustrate this point, the Report
contains another example, which resembles the Montreal shootings:
For example, she might offer proof that a defendant entered a
department store carrying a gun, picked out women in the
store and shot her while screaming anti-women epithets, and
leaving the many nearby men unharmed. The fact that the
attacker in this example verbally expressed his bias against
women is helpful, but not mandatory. The fact that the at-
tacker segregated the men from the women and then shot
only the women might be evidence enough of his gender-
based motivation.128
Though the Report contends that the VAWA covers a wide range of
gender-motivated actions, these cases, along with other examples cited
below, reveal much about how the authors of the VAWA understand
gender-motivated violence. Establishing gender-motivation will certainly
present difficult problems of proof and fact-finding. To escape this
difficulty, the authors have unfortunately chosen to rely upon facile, but
deeply problematic, analogies to race-based civil rights remedies rather
than develop concepts of gender-motivation that accurately reflect the
reality of the violence.
The authors of the VAWA would presumably condemn the ex-
clusion of gender by the ADL and Ladd. The VAWA does, after all,
include gender, which "corrects" the models. The problem is that laws
never exist in a vacuum. Dozens of previous Congresses have passed
127. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 52.
128. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 51.
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progressive civil rights laws, only to watch courts interpret them nar-
rowly, if not void them entirely. 29 Congress cannot merely add gender
to a list of protected categories when the structures, theories, and
justifications of the deficient institutions are all premised upon the
exclusion of gender. Instead, it must fully understand the complex
institutional reasons that a gender gap exists and act deliberately to
counteract those reasons.
The two examples cited in the Senate Report embody all the major
elements of the ADL's analysis of hate violence and Ladd's analysis of
collective violence. The first example cited above begins with "a black
civil rights worker [who] is beaten by an avowed white supremacist who
has terrorized a predominantly African-American neighborhood."'130
The victim and attacker belong to different races. The attacker "has a
history of assaulting African-American people" and "does not typically
assault white people." 131 The attacker not only "belonged to a white
supremacist organization," but also "shouted racial epithets during the
assault." 132 The Report makes clear that individual factors might not
prove bias, but that "taken together these factors may show racial
bias." 133 This is a classic scenario of hate violence. First, the attacker
clearly belongs to a group. In this case, it is organized. Second, he
terrorizes his victims randomly as representatives of all blacks. The
victims are entirely interchangeable and have no unique characteristics
that make the violence personal. Third, he terrorizes them in public
space-maybe in a park or on a street-as he is in a predominantly
African-American neighborhood. He may even attack a few in their
homes, but the point is he does not belong there. Fourth, he made his
motivations unambiguous by shouting his racism for all to hear. Fifth,
he treats blacks differently than he treats whites. "But for" the victims'
race, he would not have attacked them. If he typically assaulted both
whites and blacks, it would not be discrimination under this model.
The lesson of this example becomes clear when the Senate Report
instructs how the VAWA should operate: "Gender-motivated crimes
should be viewed in precisely the same way."1 34 Both examples of
129. See, e.g., Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
MICH. L. REv. 1323 (1952).
130. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 52.
131. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 52.
132. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 52.
133. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 52 (emphasis added).
134. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 52 (emphasis added).
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gender-motivated violence cited in the Report demonstrate this lesson.
First, both attackers clearly belong to a group, though neither is or-
ganized. The group is not simply "men," though it is critical that the
attackers and victims be of different groups. The first attacker belongs
to the group of "serial rapists" and the second to "mass killers." Second,
both terrorize their victims randomly as representatives of all women.
The victims are entirely interchangeable and have no unique characteris-
tics that make the violence personal. In particular, the mass murderer
shoots the women who happen to be shopping in the store-the
women's individual identities do not matter to him. Third, the attack-
ers terrorize women in public spaces. The serial rapist may rape women
in a park or on a street. He may even attack a few in their homes, but
he does not belong there. Similarly, the mass murderer attacks in the
public space of a department store. Fourth, they made their motivations
unambiguous by "shout[ingl," "screaming," and "hurl[ing]" misogynist
slurs and anti-woman epithets for all to hear.135 Fifth, they treat
women differently than they treat men. "But for" his victims' sex, the
serial rapist would not have attacked them; "but for" his victims' sex,
the mass murderer would not have shot them. The mass murderer
"picked out women in the store" to shoot, "leaving the many nearby
men unharmed."' 136 If the serial rapist attacked or if the mass murderer
slaughtered both men and women, it would not be discrimination. As
extreme as they are, according to the Report, these individual cir-
cumstances may not be enough: "Again, the jury might not be con-
vinced by any one of these circumstances individually but could con-
clude that, taken together, they show gender bias."' 3 7 While this model
might fit the history of racial violence against men in this country, it
does not fit the history of gender-motivated violence, for the reasons
discussed above. Nevertheless, the Senate Report applies the ADL bias
violence reasoning to gender-motivated violence. Substitute gender for
race in the ADL reasoning, and you have the VAWA's model crime.
Applying this reasoning literally can devastate victims of gender-
motivated violence. As an example, consider a woman who brings a case
against her husband. Part of the justification for the VAWA is the
135. In the serial rapist example in the 1991 Senate Report, the rapist "hurls misogynist
slurs" as he attacks his victims. S. Rep. No. 197, supra note 14, at 50. In the 1993
report, he merely "shouts misogynist slurs as he attacks his victims." S. Rep. No.
138, supra note 11, at 52.
136. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 51.
137. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 52.
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pervasive abuse suffered by women at the hands of their male partners.
The Senate Report begins its discussion of the need for the legislation
by listing the harms of domestic violence. In the section entitled "Pur-
pose," the Report states:
In 1991, at least 21,000 domestic crimes were reported to the
police every week; at least i.1 million reported as-
saults-including aggravated assaults, rapes, and
murders-were committed against women in their homes that
year; unreported domestic crimes have been estimated to be
more than three times this total. . . As many as 4 million
women a year are the victims of domestic violence. . . .The
Violence Against Women Act is intended to respond both to
the underlying attitude that this violence is somehow less
serious than other crime and to the resulting failure of our
criminal justice system to address such violence 38
The Report further elaborates that the goal of the legislation is "to
educate the public and those within the justice system against the
archaic prejudices that blame women for the beatings and the rapes
they suffer . ."-39 The VAWA's purpose shows that it should work
against stereotypes that blame victims of gender-motivated violence and
that treat their violence less seriously than other crimes. All of title II
addresses domestic violence as a serious crime of gender-motivated
violence. In addition, the purpose of title III is "to provide an effective
anti-discrimination remedy for violently expressed gender prejudice." 140
Despite the progressive intent of the VAWA, some of its sponsors at
times reflect the same "archaic prejudices" that the Act seeks to work
against. Part of this problem arises because the authors sometimes frame
the Act as applying existing doctrine to the analogous problem of
gender-motivated violence, rather than understanding this violence on
its own terms.
The public-private dichotomies embodied in the ADL model hate
crime often surface in the VAWA's legislative history. In the i99i
Senate Report, Senator Biden, the VAWA's sponsor, argued that the
Act would not flood the federal courts with domestic cases: "title III
does not cover everyday domestic cases, nor does it cover random mugg-
138. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 37, 38.
139. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 38.
140. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 38.
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ings.. .. Indeed, title III expressly bars any cause of action for a ran-
dom crime, including crimes motivated by personal animosity."14' The
Senate Report further states that title III does not cover "random ...
beatings in the home":
One of the most serious misunderstandings of title III has
concerned its scope. For example, some have wrongly sug-
gested that it will cover random muggings or beatings in the
home or elsewhere. This argument is incorrect and is belied
by the text of the proposed statute: this is a discrimination
statute, not a felony protection bill. The cause of action
provided under title III is strictly limited to violent felonies
"motivated by gender." A special limitation section added
since the original introduction of the bill specifically provides
that "random" crimes not motivated by gender are not
covered by the statute and do not give rise to a cause of ac-
tion. 142
Whatever Biden actually meant by "random beatings in the home" and
"everyday domestic violence," his statements may be a chilling
forewarning that few, if any, "beatings in the home" will be actionable
as civil rights violations. Biden misunderstood the nature of sexualized
abuse. Brenneke argues that his statements provide "shocking reminders
that 'everyday domestic violence' still can be viewed as something other
than discrimination against women and an inherent building block of
women's subordination." 143 Fortunately, Biden excised these statements
from the 1993 Senate Report. Nevertheless, the possibility that violent
gender-motivated acts can be construed as caused by "personal
animosity" effectively precludes a civil rights remedy in most cases in
which the parties know each other. Even without Biden's ,tatements,
the structural logic of the civil rights remedy might lead a judge to
make the same conclusions, because battering by an intimate partner or
spouse does not resemble other forms of bias violence.
The concept of bias violence, as understood by the term hate
crime, is relatively young and can still be transformed. Even though
most proponents of the concept have taken great pains to exclude
gender, it is possible for advocates of the VAWA to make the concept
141. S. Rep. No. 197, supra note 14, at 69 (emphasis added).
142. S. Rep. No. 197, supra note 14, at 48.
143. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 70.
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of bias violence work for women. Instead of trying to analogize
domestic violence to racially-motivated bias violence, advocates should
begin with the reality of domestic violence, the ways in which it reflects
ideologies of gender, and the manner in which it violates the victim's
civil rights.
Part of the problem is that the phrase "hate crime" does not
adequately describe the violence. Suzanne Pharr finds national and state
hate crime statutes,
inadequate not only because they exclude women but because
they do not create a clear definition of hate violence as being
violence from those who have power against those who do
not. What is also lacking is the role that institutions and
societal norms play in the creation of hate violence.144
Pharr argues that the more appropriate term for such violence is "instit-
utionally supported violence."145 Rather than use hate, which is a
psychological term, "the real issue is systematic oppression. To use hate
as the defining term calls up serious questions about strategies," such as
relying upon oppressive and violent institutions as a solution. 146 The
term "institutionally supported violence" identifies bias violence as
contextual. Group categories only exist and have meaning in a cultural
context. Focusing on the role of institutions rather than hate under-
stands social responses to certain groups and power inequalities as social
constructions. For judges and advocates, this understanding of bias
violence better protects those most vulnerable to gender-motivated
violence because it focuses on the power inequalities that make a civil
rights response necessary in the first place.
II. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF APPLYING THE MODELS
The Senate Report quotes the testimony of Illinois Attorney General
Roland Burris to show the need for a civil rights remedy. "Until
women as a class have the same protection offered others who are the
object of irrational, hate-motivated abuse and assault, we as a society
144. Suzanne Pharr, Redefining Hate Violence 1 (Feb. 1991) (unpublished mailing, on
file with author).
145. Pharr, supra note 144, at 3.
146. Pharr, supra note 144, at 3.
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should feel humiliated and ashamed."147 As discussed in Section I,
however, simply transferring the model of civil rights developed to
address racially-motivated violence to gender-motivated violence may
limit the effectiveness of this remedy. This section describes four
specific problems that will likely surface in VAWA actions.
The first two problems result from the direct application of the
traditional civil rights model to gender-motivated violence. First, this
traditional model constructs legal identities in ways that might harm
women. Second, this model does not address the reality of gender-based
violence.
The final two problems, which result from the concept of "real
rape," will largely determine which actions are recognized as legitimate
instances of gender-motivated violence. According to Professor Susan
Estrich, legally recognized rapes contain a number of elements. In the
strongest case, the rapist is a stranger to the victim, who overpowers her
with a weapon or severe, disproportionate physical force while she
resists. While often unstated, the rapist in this scenario is a man of
color and the victim is white. 148 The first result of this history is that
the definition of a "crime of violence" in the VAWA risks reintroducing
force and resistance requirements, which would harm victims. Second,
the mixed history of racism and sexism in rape law would make the
application of the VAWA model to gender-motivated violence
problematic, unless the history is understood.
A. The Construction of Women's Identities
For victims of gender-motivated violence, choosing a legal identity
might prove painful. Ruthann Robson writes that "the insistence on
categorization itself violently atomizes us into separate identities." 149
Robson cites the following story from the Advocate written by a lesbian
rape survivor:
As I was being raped, I was called a dyke and a cunt. The
rapist used those terms as if they were interchangeable. And as
I talk to other women who have been raped-straight and
gay-I hear similar stories. Was my attack antilesbian? Or was
147. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 49.
148. ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 8.
149. Ruthann Robson, Incendiary Categories: Lesbian!ViolencelLaw, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN &
L. 1, 16 (1993).
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it antiwoman? I think that facts are simple. I was raped be-
cause as a woman I'm considered rapeable and, as a lesbian
I'm considered a threat. How can you separate those two
things?150
Under schemes such as the VAWA, which force categorization of acts
of violence, lesbians, for example, would have to emphasize a particular
aspect of their identity, their sex, at the expense of other aspects.
Alternatively, the Hate Crimes Statistics Act includes "crimes that
manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orienta-
tion, or ethnicity,"' 151 a list that includes sexual orientation, but does
not include gender. A lesbian rape victim would have to prove she was
raped because she was a woman-not because she was a lesbian-to
have a chance at a federal civil rights action under the VAWA. 152
However, to have her experience count as a hate crime, she would need
to stress her identity as a lesbian and "hope that the FBI statisticians
150. Robson, supra note 149, at 16 (quoting Victoria A. Brownworth, An Unreported
Crisis, ADvocATE, Nov. 5, 1991, at 52).
151. Hate Crimes Statistics Act, supra note 85, at § 1 (b)(1).
152. Under current civil rights laws, federal courts do not recognize a connection
between sexual orientation and gender. For example, in Dillon v. Frank, 1992 Lab,
Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at D-1 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 1992), the Sixth Circuit dismissed a
Title VII claim brought by a Postal Service employee harassed because his co-
workers perceived him to be gay (holding that Title VII's "because of sex" standard
cannot mean "because of anything relating to being male or female, sexual roles, or
to sexual behavior."). See also Carreno v. International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local Union No. 226, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 81 (D. Kan.
1990). For a critical discussion of both Dillon and Carreno, see Samuel A. Marcos-
son, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sexual Discrimination
Under Title VII, 81 GEo. L.J. 1 (1992).
Suzanne Pharr argues that "[to be a lesbian is to be perceived as someone who
has stepped out of line, who has moved out of sexual/economic dependence on a
male, who is woman-identified. A lesbian is perceived as someone who can live
without a man, and who is therefore (however illogically) against men." Suzanne
Pharr, Homophobia as a Weapon of Sexism, in RAcE, CLAss & GENDER IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN INTEGRATED STUDY 435 (Paula S. Rothenberg ed., 1992).
Homophobia attempts to control women by labeling as lesbians those whose
behavior is not acceptable, whose behavior departs from the social role norm. See
Pharr, supra at 436-37. See also SUZANNE PHAR, HOMOPHOBIA: A WEAPON OF
Smxism (1988); Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5
SIGNs 631 (1980). For a discussion of using gender-based civil rights laws for
lesbians and gay men, see David Frazee, Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-
Motivated Violence (1993) (unpublished A.B. honors thesis, Stanford University, on
file with author).
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agree with her."' 5 3
The legal categories available in relevant statutes, not the ex-
periences of those victimized, determine the narrative structure of
events. Simply including both gender and sexual orientation in either
statute would not remove the dichotomy of gender and sexuality, as
current civil rights laws do not function well when multiple identities
overlap. 154 Category boundaries rarely permit adequate descriptions of
discriminatory acts, whether the rapist, survivor, or statistician chooses
the category. This presents a paradox, because the very category boun-
daries necessary to construct civil rights laws often break down. Though
the legal construction of identities may never represent anything called
"truth" or "authentic experience" for all involved, the law can better use
civil rights categories situationally to address specific cases. 155
'The VAWA accepts the way that courts have constructed legal
identities, potentially excluding cases in which gender-based motivation
interacts with other motivations for violence, or cases in which the
victims are not white and heterosexual. A number of cases involving
black women in Title VII suits illustrate the difficulty of single category
analysis. Since the VAWA's authors based its definition of gender-
motivation on Title VII, this "body of case law will provide substantial
guidance to [VAWA] triers of fact," 156 and will directly bear on how
courts will interpret the VAWA.
153. Robson, supra note 149, at 16.
154. Robson, supra note 149, at 16. Robson describes five levels of violence in the Hate
Crimes Statistics Act. Robson, supra note 149, at 14-17. See also RlTHANN ROB-
SON, LESBIAN (OuT)LAw 145-55 (1992).
155. A full discussion of a feminist theory of knowledge is beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle. One viewpoint is the radical subjectivity theory which privileges the
standpoint of the victim. This solution may provide for more just legal remedies for
those harmed, but may not fully describe the social reasons for an event or its
consequences. Katharine Bartlett, for example, warns against embracing a victim's
standpoint in feminist legal theory because it risks omitting important perspectives
necessary for those who wish to end oppression:
I doubt that being a victim is the only experience that gives special access
to truth. Although victims know something about victimization that non-
victims do not, victims do not have exclusive access to truth about op-
pression. The positions of others--co-victims, passive bystanders, even the
victimizers-yield perspectives of special knowledge that those who seek
to end oppression must understand.
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829, 875 (1990).
156. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 53.
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In DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div.,1 7 five black
female employees challenged General Motor's seniority system by
claiming it perpetuated past discrimination against black women. 158
The court granted summary judgment for the defendant because:
[P]laintiffs have failed to cite any decisions which have stated
that Black women are a special class to be protected from
discrimination.... [They] should not be allowed to combine
statutory remedies to create a new 'super-remedy' which
would give them relief beyond what the drafters of the
relevant statutes .intended. Thus, this lawsuit must be ex-
amined to see if it states a cause of action for race discrimina-
tion, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a
combination of both.159
Although General Motors did not hire black women prior to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, it did hire white women. 160 Hence, the court
determined General Motors' seniority system did not perpetuate sex
discrimination. After disposing of the claim of sex discrimination, the
court dismissed the racial discrimination claim and recommended
consolidation of the suit with another case against General Motors
brought by black men. 161 The court foreclosed the possibility that
plaintiffs could remedy multiple layers of oppression through existing
laws:
The legislative history surrounding Title VII does not indicate
that the goal of the statute was to create a new classification
of "black women" who would have greater standing than, for
example, a black male. The prospect of the creation of new
classes of protected minorities, governed only by the mathe-
matical principles of permutation and combination, clearly
raises the prospect of opening the hackneyed Pandora's
box.162
In the DeGraffenreid approach, black women may claim legal protection
157. 413 E Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
158. Id. at 143.
159. DeGraffenreid, 413 E Supp. at 143.
160. DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 144.
161. DeGrafenried, 413 E Supp. at 145.
162. DeGraffenreid, 413 E Supp. at 145.
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only insofar as their experiences coincide with that of white women or
black men. 163
In 1983, in Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., Div. of Summa
Corp., 164 the Ninth Circuit did not permit a black woman to bring a
discrimination suit on behalf of women because "Moore had never
claimed before the EEOC that she was discriminated against as a
female, but only as a Black female.... [T]his raised serious doubts as to
Moore's ability to adequately represent white female employe1s."165
Analogously, the D.C. District Court decided in 1986 in Judge v.
Marsh,166 that a Title VII plaintiff must choose only one category of
discrimination for her suit. 167 Although a white woman does not
represent all women any better than a woman of color, courts do not
question the ability of a white woman to represent all women. Courts
often take race privilege for granted, dismissing "hybrid" cases in favor
of "pure" claims of sex or race discrimination. 168
Sometimes courts show more sympathy for multiple sources of
discrimination. In i98o in Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action
Ass'n, 169 the Fifth Circuit allowed a black female plaintiff to combine
race and sex discrimination, stating "discrimination against black
females [could] exist even in the absence of discrimination against black
men or white women."170 Similarly, in the 1987 case of Hicks v. Gates
Rubber Co.,171 the Tenth Circuit decided in a Title VII case brought by
a black woman that evidence of racial and sexual harassment may be
considered jointly. 172 These conflicting results from different districts
exemplify the difficulty federal courts have trying to understand dis-
crimination.
Whether evidence may be combined or not, the "but for" test used
in differential treatment analysis to determine the existence of dis-
163. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist
Politics, U. Cm. LEGAL F. 139, 143 (1989).
164. 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983).
165. Id. at 480 (emphasis added).
166. 649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986).
167. Id. at 780.
168. Crenshaw, supra note 163, at 145.
169. 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
170. Id. at 1032.
171. 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'don reh'g, 928 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1991).
172. Id. at 1416. See also MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 1291 n.4 6 (discussing Jefferies
and Hicks).
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crimination fails to detect or measure inequality adequately. If a person
would not have experienced some action "but for" some identified
characteristic, then the action might be discriminatory. "But for" the
persons race or "but for" the person's gender uses the most privileged
as a model. Men of color become the model for racial discrimination,
since "but for" their race, they would be white men; white women
become the model for sex discrimination since they too would be white
men "but for" their gender.
Professor Kimberle Crenshaw stresses that the problem is not the
inability of judges to handle cases in which multiple categories intersect.
She notes that "no case has been discovered in which a court denied a
white male's attempt to bring a reverse discrimination claim on similar
grounds-that is, that sex and race claims cannot be combined because
Congress did not intend to protect compound classes."173 White men,
under the DeGraffenreid framework, should have the same burdens as
black women in proving their claims separately. They could not use sex
if black men are not discriminated against and could not use race if
white women are not discriminated against. According to Crenshaw,
the compound nature of claims by white men never occurs to courts.
Yet it seems that courts do not acknowledge the compound
nature of most reverse discrimination cases. That Black
women's claims automatically raise the question of compound
discrimination and white males' "reverse discrimination" cases
do not suggest that the notion of compoundedness is some-
how contingent upon an implicit norm that is not neutral but
is white male. Thus, Black women are perceived as a com-
pound class because they are two steps removed from a white
male norm, while white males are apparently not perceived to
be a compound class because they somehow represent the
norm.
174
Discrimination doctrine helps those closest to the standard of equality,
middle-class white heterosexual men. Those who experience multiple
layers of oppression, such as women of color, find little relief in courts
in which they must state a single category of discrimination in order to
bring suit. Even allowing evidence of racial and sexual harassment to be
combined still presumes a summation model of identity: being black
173. Crenshaw, supra note 163, at 142 n.12.
174. Crenshaw, supra note 163, at 142 n.12.
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plus being a woman equals being a black woman, as if black women do
not have unique experiences, or at least experiences neither shared by,
nor predicted by, the experiences of black men and white women.
Professor Angela Harris, discussing essentialist thinking in feminist legal
theory, concludes that "[t]he result of essentialism is to reduce the lives
of people who experience multiple forms of oppression to addition
problems: 'racism + sexism = straight black women's experience,' or
'racism + sexism + homophobia = black lesbian experience."' 175 Identity
cannot be constructed by adding the experiences of those closest to the
standard of equality, "forcibly fragment[ing] "17 6 those whose lives are
subject to analysis.
The history of differential treatment analysis suggests that women
of color and lesbians may experience difficulty bringing a suit under the
VAWA. To win, a victim must prove that she was attacked because of
her gender. When multiple motivations plausibly instigated the
violence, victims will have to prove gender above the others. This
burden makes the legal construction of identities critical to many who
might use the Act. The differential treatment model creates a further
difficulty, because in some cases it might not detect gender-motivated
violence at all.
B. Differential Treatment Test Fails to Understand Violence Against Women
The "but for" model of discrimination when applied to gender-based
violence obscures the nature of inequality and abuse. The "but for," or
"differential treatment," or "disparate treatment," approach relegates
questions of sexuality and power inequalities to the- periphery. In the
case of sex discrimination, "[t]he sole issue becomes whether the
coercion, whatever form it takes, would have been imposed on a
man."177 Andrea Brenneke faults this approach because "there is no
'other' with whom ... the disparate treatment analysis would treat 'sex'
as secondary to a 'but for' comparison of the way the defendant batters
his wife versus other women or men."178 Disparate treatment com-
175. Angela R Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv.
581, 588 (1990) (citing Deborah K. King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness:
The Context of a Black Feminist Ideolog', 14 SIGNs 42, 51 (1988)).
176. Harris, supra note 175, at 589.
177. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 83-84 (citing Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STANF. L.
Rav. 813, 820 (1991)).
178. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 84.
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parisons often leave plaintiffs with no way of prevailing. Brenneke
argues it leads "to an 'indiscriminate violence' defense at best and, at
worst, may result in claimant's failure to set forth her claim because
there is often no 'other' target with whom to compare the defendant's
actions." 179 A battering husband, for example, may argue that he ran-
domly beats some persons with whom he comes into contact "indi-
scriminately," shielding his actions from charges that he discriminates.
Alternatively, he may argue that he beats no one else, so that his
violence is not motivated by his victim's membership in a protected
category, but is motivated by personal animosity, a non-discriminatory
reason.
This supposedly "neutral" framework ignores the social structure in
which some are vulnerable to abuse and how violence enforces that
structure. For example, heterosexual marriage, as legally constructed, is
a gendered institution-so much so that same gender marriage is
prohibited in every state.180 Women in this context are vulnerable
because they occupy a social position defined by their gender (wife),
with the weight of legal and economic institutions both defining and
enforcing that position.181 Inquiries into motivation for violence should
focus on the social function the violence performs, which concentrates
legal analysis on the particular power inequalities and role expectations
in an abusive relationship.18 2
Similar to the "indiscriminate" violence defense, the model of
equal protection has created in Title VII sexual harassment law the
specter of the "bisexual harasser," who sexually harasses male and female
subordinates equally.' 8 3 For example, in Barnes v. Costle,18'4 the court
wrote that "[i]n the case of the bisexual superior, the insistence upon
sexual favors would not constitute gender discrimination because it
would apply to male and female employees alike." 18 5 Even Judge Bork,
179. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 85.
180. See Mary C. Dunlap, The Lesbian and Gay Marriage Debate: A Microcosm of Our
Hopes and Troubles in the Nineties, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 63 (1991) (arguing that
granting marriage without regard to gender may work against the gendered history
of the institution of marriage).
181. See generally LENOt E J. WEiTZMAN, THE MARIAGE CONTRACT: A GUIDE TO LIVING
WITH LovERs AND SPOUSES 1-223 (1981).
182. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 85.
183. See Marcosson, supra note 152, at 11 n.48 (1992).
184. 561 E2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
185. Id. at 990 n.55.
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while on the D.C. Circuit, denounced the "bizarre result" that "only
the differentiating libido runs afoul of Title VII."116 If one employs a
differential treatment test of discrimination, then harassment, no matter
how hostile, how sexualized, or how harmful, does not constitute
discriminatory conduct, if both women and men are equally exposed to
it.
An analysis of male rape, when men rape men, suggests the limita-
tions of a differential treatment test for both male and female plaintiffs
under the VAWA.187 Men as a group are not deprived of civil rights
because of rape and other forms of gender-motivated violence the way
women are. Yet, Senator Biden has often invoked male prison rape as
an example of the type of gender-motivated violence the VAWA would
cover. At one press conference, Senator Biden responded to a question
about whether all rapes could constitute civil rights violations under the
VAWA:
I might add.., in the issue of rape, a male can bring a civil
rights action. There is a good deal of rape in prison of males
by males. So although it is a very small portion of the
problem, this is literally gender-motivated, and in a strange
sense gender-neutral. If the crime is a consequence of gender
motivation, and that predicate can be laid down in court,
then there can be a civil rights action. In almost all rape
you'd find that situation. s88
Biden colloquially understands male rape as motivated by gender, but
effecting this understanding in federal courts may require a careful
examination of what constitutes gender-motivated violence-especially
since courts usually do not recognize violence which appears in any
sense "gender-neutral" as sex-based discrimination. In particular, under-
standing gender-motivated violence may require understanding why
men sexually assault not only adult women and girls, but also, to a
186. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 E2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
187. A full development of the contributions that understanding male rape can make to
a feminist analysis of sexual violence requires a separate article. See Darieck Scott,
Between Men and Women/Betweeen Men and Men: Male Rape and the Law
(1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see Frazee, supra note 152, at
46-65.
188. Senator Joseph Biden, Press Conference to Release the Report The Response to Rape:
Detours on the Road to Equal Justice, May 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Reuter Transcript Report File.
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lesser extent, adult men and boys.
Available statistics indicate that men are raped, and not just in
institutional arrangements like prisons. Limited evidence suggests that
up to ten percent of all rape victims are men,189 and that most of the
rapists are heterosexual.190 Though many have used examples of rape
against men to belittle the reality of sexual violence against women, 191
only by acknowledging male rape can one understand critical com-
ponents of male sexual violence.192 Insufficient research has been done
to determine the extent of rape and other gender-motivated crimes
against men, and almost no theory addresses the question of how it
should be legally treated. It is important to admit that thorough
research might reveal that there are no important experiential dif-
ferences between male rape and female rape, and, even if there are, that
there should be no differing legal understanding. But, assuming this a
priori risks missing important elements in the way the conflation of
power and sex is constructed, inflicted, and experienced. An analysis of
male rape could transform legal understandings of sexual assault, but-
tress critiques of masculine violence, and provide sophisticated argu-
ments for remedying sexual violence as a civil rights violation for both
male and female plaintiffs.
The fact that sexual assault of men involves other men as the
attackers in almost all cases seriously upsets the differential treatment
analysis recounted in the Senate Report. Senator Biden's example of
prison rape, if it is to be considered motivated by gender, must there-
fore rely upon a different conception of gender-motivation than that
189. Cf Wendy Rae Willis, The Gun is Always Pointed: Sexual Violence and tle III of
the Violence Against Women Act, 80 GEo. L.J. 2197, 2198 (stating that Bureau of
Justice Statistics indicate that between 1973 and 1982 1.5 million women and
123,000 men were raped) (citing Ronald J. Ostrom, Typical Rape Victim Called
Young, Poor, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1985, at 8); B. D. Forman, Reported Male Rape,
7 VICrIMOLOGY 235-36 (1982) (male rape constitutes between 5% and 10% of all
rapes reported to the police).
190. RICHIE J. MCMULLEN, MALE RAPE: BREAKING THE SILENCE ON THE LAST TABOO
24-27 (1990); Scott, supra note 187, at 26-30.
191. See, e.g., Hans Bader, Don't Alter Rape Law Because of Smith Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 1991, at A32 (complaining that Maclinnon's approach to rape would
deprive male victims of equal treatment).
192. Scott, supra note 187, at 24 ("While it is very likely the case that many of those
who invoke the 'men are raped too' refrain do so in a way that belittles or trivializes
women's experience of rape as women, it is not altogether true that, among males,
only children and prisoners are raped, and that there is no useful contribution that
acknowledging the reality of male rape can make to feminism.").
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suggested by the Report. Even if same-sex rapes were fully covered in
civil rights jurisprudence, the model of discriminatory treatment would
exclude many cases of male rape. Researchers Groth and Burgess noted
that rapists who attacked men showed remarkable similarity to rapists
who attacked women. Indeed, many of these rapists did rape women:
"The gender of the victim did not appear to be of specific significance
to half of the subjects. They appeared instead to be relatively indis-
criminate with regard to the choice of victim, that is, their victims
included males and females, adults and children." 193 Because these
rapists do not "discriminate" on the basis of gender, no gender-based
discrimination exists under a differential treatment analysis, meaning
that victims-female and male-might have no cause of action under
the VAWA.
To avoid these problems, the VAWA could allow plaintiffs to focus
upon the meaning of the rapist's violent male sexual behavior. Scott
summarizes the research on rapists who attack men to conclude the
rapists "assaulted their victims because they found conquest and control
exciting; because they explicitly found degrading and humiliating their
victims erotic; because they were angry with their victims, and desired
to punish them; and sometimes, because they felt pressured by their
peers to participate in gang rape." 194 The sex-based violent masculinity
of the rapist could constitute the motivation or animus of the act. Of
course, this approach risks reintroducing the subject-object split dis-
cussed above, 195 which is why it must be rooted in the empirical social
reality of the violence.
Aside from producing the "bizarre result" bemoaned by Bork, the
differential treatment test also creates uneven decisions. For example,
abuse from a gay employer constitutes harassment while abuse of a gay
employee does not. EEOC regulations foreclose the possibility of
homosexual employees bringing Title VII claims: "If a male supervisor
harasses a male employee because of the employee's homosexuality, then
the supervisor's conduct would not be sexual harassment since it is
based on the employee's sexual preference, not on his gender." 196
Homosexual employers' actions, however, are covered:
193. A. N. Groth & A. W Burgess, Male Rape: Offenders and Victims, 137 Am. J.
PSYCHIATRY 806, 808 (1980).
194. Scott, supra note 187, at 29.
195. See supra note 120, and accompanying text.
196. Marcosson, supra note 152, at 3 n.13 (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH)
§ 615.2(b)(3) (july 1987)).
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Ironically, while homosexuals are not protected by Title
VII, employees are protected from sexual harassment by
homosexuals. In Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc., the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that a
plaintiff who alleges that he was terminated because he refused
the sexual advances of his male supervisor states a cause of
action under Title VII. The court found that demands by a
homosexual supervisor were ones "that would not be directed
to a female," and thus involved "the exaction of a condition
which, but for his ... sex, the employee would not have
faced."1 97
The apparent contradiction of these decisions is partly attributable to
the normal inconsistency of rulings among federal courts-different
persons at different times render different decisions, even when many of
the issues are similar. Yet, the decisions fail to address consistently
existing power inequalities along the axes of gender and sexual orienta-
tion. A homosexual employer who harasses employees should indeed
incur sanctions, but not because of the homophobia of district court
judges, and not at the expense of sacrificing protection of homosexual
employees.
Samuel Marcosson suggests that courts need not resort in these
cases to a differential treatment test, but should instead use the hostile
environment standard. Under this approach, the sexual nature of the
bisexual harasser's actions and the resulting effect upon the work
environment make the employment action "because of sex." 198 The
introduction of sexually hostile elements into a work environment
disfavors employees who are comparatively powerless in relation to their
employers or peers, even if the elements are not directed at any par-
ticular individual or group. The harassment need only be "sufficiently
severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment
and create an abusive working environment.' "199
The "hostile work environment" model is one of the better existing
legal methods for understanding power inequality in employment
situations. It is unlikely, however, that many courts would allow a
197. Marcosson, supra note 152, at 10 (citation omitted).
198. Marcosson, supra note 152, at 11 n.48.
199. Marcosson, supra note 152, at 11 (citing Meritor Say. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th
Cir. 1982))).
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woman battered by her husband or intimate partner to use the model
of a sexually hostile environment, especially in a "private" family situa-
tion, to prove discrimination under the VAWA. Nevertheless, Andrea
Brenneke argues for such a standard:
Courts should impose a standard that violent conduct by a
domestic partner that has the purpose or effect of unreason-
ably interfering with an individual's work, family or social
performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
domestic environment constitutes a "crime of violence
motivated by gender."200
The "sexually hostile home environment" standard solves many of the
problems with differential treatment analysis, but would require chang-
ing current legal doctrines, which exclude the family from civil rights
scrutiny. The hostile environment test assumes what the differential
treatment test ignores: unequal relationships of power in gender-
motivated violence. The only "bizarre results" are those that do not
understand these gender-based inequalities.
C. An Excessive Force Requirement for Gender Motivated Violence
A plaintiff's ability to establish a successful cause of action under the
VAWA relies on a court's determination that violence committed
against her was not a ("random") domestic affair, motivated by personal
animosity, or caused by a prior relationship for which she is to blame.
The experience of rape victims in criminal trials demonstrates the
practical difficulty of attempts to define rape and other forms of gender-
motivated violence as a civil rights violation-juries and judges often
demand extraordinary proof before they believe victims of these
crimes.20 1 Though the standard of proof under the VAWA will differ
from criminal trials, the other attitudinal and structural barriers will
remain. Being a "perfect victim" means being harmed in ways con-
structed by the law, a small subset of the ways that those victimized
actually experience their violation. Penetration, force, resistance, and
consent are limiting notions by which to define sexual violence. Despite
the VAWA's stated goal of working against archaic stereotypes which
200. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 82.
201. See Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair
Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1013 (1991).
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disadvantage women in the legal process, the VAWA's cause of action
inadvertently introduces a force requirement analogous to that used
under the common law. This limitation allows courts to exclude all acts
except those that meet the traditional standards of force and resistance.
The VAWA, in section 3o2(b), creates a right to be free from
"crimes of violence motivated by gender."202 Section 3o2(d)(z) defines a
crime of violence as "an act or series of acts that would constitute a
felony ... and that could come within the meaning of State or Federal
offenses described in section i6 of [T]itle 1S, United States Code."20 3
Rather than define a right to be free from acts of violence, the VAWA
uses crimes of violence. This means that victims might have to prove
that what occurred to them met criminal standards-though no
criminal conviction is necessary. This is especially a problem in states
without reformed sexual violence legislation. The variation in laws from
state to state would render the VAWA nationally inconsistent. Referring
plaintiffs to state criminal statutes also defeats one of the purposes of
national civil rights legislation-compensating for state remedies which
fail to provide relief to victims of gender-motivated crimes. Specifically,
some states still have partial exemptions or lower penalties for marital
rape and incest, 204 still exclude men from rape statutes, and still require
victims to resist.205 The VAWA's definition perpetuates the worst
aspects of federalism by creating a federal civil rights remedy dependent
upon the very state laws whose inadequacies are part of the justification
for the federal remedy itself.
Additionally, in some cases victims might have to prove force or
violence beyond the crime itself. Even if a violent act meets a state's
definition of rape, it might not contain sufficient "force" to allow a
202. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(b) (1993).
203. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(b) (1993).
204. See, e.g., State v. Getward, 365 S.E.2d 209 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (holding husband
cannot be prosecuted for raping wife); Barnes v. Barnes, No. 66A03-8910-CV-440
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (barring incest suit). See also Martha R. Burt, Rape Myths and
Acquaintance Rape, in AcQUAINTANCE RAPE 29 (Parrot & Bechhofer eds., 1991)
("As of 1990 . . . 26 states allowed prosecutions [for marital rape] only under
restricted circumstances."); Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the
Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. Rxv. 45, 46 (1990) ("The majority
[of states] continue [sic] to permit rape or sexual assault within marriage by accord-
ing it a lower level of criminality than extramarital rape .... ).
205. IDAHO CODE § 18.6101 (1991) ("Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished
with a female . .. [where she resists but her resistance is overcome by force or
violence.").
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VAWA action. Because the language of the VAWA limits the scope of
the civil rights provisions to violent felonies, a vast range of cases that
should be included as civil rights violations, such as many instances of
"domestic violence," which are often classified as misdemeanors, are
excluded.
Section i6 of Title i8 defines a crime of violence as an offense that
"is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense." 20 6 This standard requires federal
courts to examine state and federal criminal codes to determine whether
the act committed (I) was a felony and (z) involved a substantial risk of
physical force. Section 16(a) alternately defines "crime of violence" as an
offense that has "as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person or property of another."20 7 Even
when state sexual assault or rape definitions require only proof of non-
consensual sex,20 federal courts may read in an additional force require-
ment for VAWA actions.
When courts interpret force requirements, they often require a
display of physical force. In the 1985 Pennsylvania case of Com-
monwealth v. Mlinarich,209 the court reversed a rape conviction because
the defendant had not used physical force. 210 In Mlinarich, the
fourteen-year-old victim was released from a juvenile detention center
when the defendant agreed to assume custody for her. When the
defendant threatened to send her back to the detention center if she
refused his sexual advances, she submitted to his requests. 211 In revers-
ing the rape conviction, the court wrote:
The definition we adopt . . . will know no age limita-
tion....
The term "force" and its derivative, "forcible," when used to
define the crime of rape, have historically been understood by
the courts and legal scholars to mean physical force or
206. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1993).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1993).
208. See, e.g, Wis. CRIM. CODE § 940.225(3) (Third degree sexual assault is defined as
"sexual intercourse with a person without the consent of that person.").
209. 498 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), aff'd by equally divided court, 542 A.2d 1335
(Pa. S. Ct. 1988).
210. Id. at 403.
211. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 396.
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violence....
... We hold that rape, as defined by the legislature . . .
requires actual physical compulsion or violence or threat of
physical compulsion or violence sufficient to prevent resistance
by a person of reasonable resolution.212
Courts are not concerned about the multiple ways in which an assailant
may force intercourse upon a victim. Rather, legal norms of physical
force and resistance still dictate sexual assault definitions in many
cases.213 For the VAWA, evidence of nonconsensual sex may not be
sufficient to show it was a "crime of violence."
The insistence on force embodies archaic stereotypes about sexual
violence that disadvantage many victims when they seek judicial
remedies. Lynn Hecht Schafran writes that a "mainstay of the myths
and stereotypes about rape is that a 'true victim' is one who sustains
serious physical injury."214 Presently, jurors "want evidence of substan-
tial physical damage, which they perceive as proof of the victim's lack
of consent. Jurors equate the victim's injuries with her level of resis-
tance, which they take to be a measure of the rapist's use of force.,"215
Schafran concludes that this understanding of sexual violence excludes
the majority of rapes: "physical injuries apart from the rape itself are
rare." 216 At least one study shows that seventy percent of rape victims
reported no physical injuries beyond the rape itself, while another
twenty-four percent reported only minor physical injuries. Only four
percent of rape victims reported serious injuries, though forty-nine
percent feared either death or serious injury.217 In addition, most rapes
involve no weapons.218 Victims may find themselves "literally frozen
with fright" during a rape, or they may "black out entirely." 219 In sum,
212. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 397, 400, 403.
213. See also Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, Crim. No. 241-1988 (Ct. C.P Monroe
County 1990), revd, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (overturning a rape
conviction because no "forcible compulsion" was shown, though the victim
"throughout the encounter ... repeatedly and continually said 'no.' ").
214. Schafran, supra note 109, at 987.
215. Schafran, supra note 109, at 987.
216. Schafran, supra note 109, at 987.
217. Schafran, supra note 109, at 987 (citing CRIME VIC'TIMS RESEARCH AND TREATMENT
CENTER, RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 5 (1992)).
218. Schafran, supra note 109, at 988. (citing GAROLINE W. HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FEMALE VICriMS OF VIOLENT CRIME, at 12 (1991)).
219. Schafran, supra note 109, at 990 (citing SEDELLE KATZ & MARY ANN MAZUR,
UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM: A SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 172-73
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the reality of rape does not conform to the stereotype of rape.
The excessive definition of force used in the VAWA definition of
"crime of violence" ignores the reality in favor of the myth. This does
not, in itself, preclude victims from effectively using the Act's civil
rights remedy. Judges can, and should, reject the stereotypes in favor of
more realistic and psychologically sophisticated understandings of force,
but the language of the VAWA does little to encourage this process.
If the VAWA continues to use the phrase "crime of violence,"
alternatives to the present definition exist. One alternative is the
Sentencing Commission Guidelines, which provide a better framework
for understanding the phrase. Congress should amend the Act or courts
should look to this alternate source for guidance in interpreting the
phrase "crime of violence." The Guidelines define "crimes of violence"
as:
[A]ny offense under federal or state law punishable by im-
prisonment for a term exceeding one year that-(i) has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another, or (ii) is burglary of a
dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.220
This definition, while it still relies upon state and federal criminal
definitions, has the advantage of only requiring potential risk. Hence,
"no specific intent would be required in some cases and reckless
endangerment might qualify as a 'crime of violence.' "221 With the
current definition, VAWA plaintiffs will need "to prove intent to use
force in order to demonstrate commission of a 'crime of violence.'"222
The application notes to the Guidelines indicate that they differ
from I8 U.S.C. § 16 in other ways. "Crime of violence" includes not
only the direct actions themselves, but also "the offenses of aiding and
(1979)). See generally People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 118-21 (Cal. 1987) (discus-
sing "frozen fright" response); DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, THE PoLmcs OF RAPE 19
(1974) (According to one victim, "I felt that I was outside my body, watching this
whole thing, that it wasn't happening to me ...."); DIANE R. KAss, THE RAPE
ViCrIM 147 (1978) (The physiological responses of victims range from choking,
gagging, nausea, vomiting, pain, urinating, and hyperventilating to losing conscious-
ness and epileptic seizures).
220. 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 4B1.2 (1993) (emphasis added).
221. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 61.
222. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 61.
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abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses." 223 The
Guidelines also contain three independent ways to define a "crime of
violence:"
"Crime of violence" includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapp-
ing, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson,
extortion, extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a
dwelling. Other offenses are included where (A) that offense
has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use,
of physical force against the person of another, or (B) the
conduct set forth (i.e., expressly charged) in the count of
which the defendant was convicted . . . by its nature,
presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
Under this section, the conduct of which the defendant was
convicted is the focus of inquiry.224
First, the government may prove that the offense fell into a category of
per se crimes of violence, such as murder and forcible sex offenses,
which are specifically enumerated. Second, the government may prove
that the offense included an element of force. Third, the government
may prove the offense presented potential risk to another person. This
definition, which is not limited to felonies, has given federal courts the
ability to use a low threshold of force in determining that a number of
acts constitute crimes of violence. Unfortunately, the use of 18 U.S.C.
§ 16 probably will not allow this flexibility.
Aside from this problem of determining which crimes involve
sufficient force, plaintiffs may only bring causes of actions when they
have suffered violent felonies. The VAWA limits "crime of violence" to
"an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the
person or that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct
presents a serious risk of physical injury to another .... "225
Many gender-motivated crimes are classified as misdemeanors,
though the violence may involve the same level of force as felonies. The
Senate Report cites a U.S. Department of Justice report to find that
"one-third of domestic attacks, if reported, would be classified as felony
rapes, robberies, or aggravated assaults. Of the remaining two-thirds
classified as simple assaults, almost one-half involved 'bodily injury at
223. 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 4B1.2, at application note 1 (1993).
224. 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 4B1.2, at application note 2 (1993).
225. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(d)(2)(A) (1993).
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least as serious as the injury inflicted in ninety percent of all robberies
and aggravated assaults.' "226 Excluding the ninety percent of simple
assaults from the VAWA trivializes the nature of the violence. Andrea
Brenneke argues that if this language is upheld "much of the pattern of
domestic violence-assault and battery-that women face might not be
covered by the VAWA." 227 The violent felony language once more links
the federal VAWA civil rights remedy to state criminal law.228 Again,
the irony is that the systematic negligence that states have demonstrated
toward domestic violence, through weak or nonexistent
statutes-precisely the reason why a federal civil rights remedy is vi-
tal-will deprive victims of their chance at a federal cause of action.
To solve the problem of "violent felonies" and "crimes of
violence," the VAWA should erase all references to "crimes of violence"
and, at a minimum, replace the phrase with "acts of violence." The
"crime of violence" language creates an unnecessary hurdle for plaintiffs
seeking to use the VAWA and, according to Andrea Brenneke,
"demonstrates congressional refusal to promote equal rights for women
more generally." 229 The result of the "crime of violence" language is
that courts will limit the types of claims under the VAWA to a narrow
scope of "perfect crimes." This language reveals the attitudes that the
Act's authors elsewhere claim to be combating with the legislation.
D. Racism and the Violence Against Women Act
Since sexual violence in the United States has been defined historically
in racial as well as gender terms, why is race absent from Congress'
investigations and the VAWA's legislative history? During the hearings
on the VAWA, few witnesses mentioned race as a factor in the legisla-
tion. The Senate Report, too, barely mentions race, except for the
legislation's effect on Native Americans. 230 This omission presents two
226. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 41 (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CUR-
RENT COURT PRACTICE AND ENFORCEMENT 4 (1990)).
227. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 64.
228. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 64.
229. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 66.
230. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 121 (1993) (amending the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 section 1722, 42 U.S.C. 3711 (1977 & Supp. III
1993), to authorize grants to "Indian tribes ... to reduce the rate of violent crimes
against women in Indian country."). See also infra notes 262-66 and accompanying
text.
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questions: (I) to what extent do racial discourses still define unlawful
sexual violence?, and (2) should one discuss and legislate gender-
motivated crimes with a consciousness of racial discourses?
Ignoring the interrelationship of racism and sexism will undercut
much of the VAWA's moral force as a civil rights remedy. The VAWA
will operate in a society in which definitions of rape are implicitly, if
not explicitly, racial. The result, absent better congressional guidance, is
that the VAWA's civil rights remedies will disproportionately burden
men of color, while providing an inadequate remedy for women of
color.
1. A Brief History of Race and Sexual Violence
Throughout American history, rape has provided a powerful tool for
justifying and implementing racial controls. Professors John D'Emilio
and Estelle Freedman surveyed the role of sexual violence in American
history, concluding: "Patterns differed, but in each region the belief that
white sexual customs were more civilized, along with the assumption
that Indian, Mexican, and black women were sexually available to white
men, supported white supremacist attitudes and justified social control
of other races." 231
The highly charged issue of interracial sex proved effective in
mobilizing both violence against minority communities and legal
prohibitions on interracial sexual contact. 232 Spanish and English
settlers justified rape of Native Americans as both a means, and a right,
of conquest. 233 For white soldiers, warfare with western Native
American tribes justified the sexual humiliation of Native American
women.234 In California, near mining areas "where local Indian tribes
had been decimated by disease and impoverishment," sexual interaction
between Indian women and white men could take the form of prostitu-
tion, but "usually took the form of rape." 235 Since the testimony of an
231. JOHN D'EMILIo & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY ol
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 87 (1988).
232. See generally BELL, supra note 40, at 64-108.
233. See RAM6N A. GUTIIRREZ, WHEN JEsus CAME, THE CORN MOTHERS WENT AwAy:
MARRIAGE, SEXUALITY, AND POWER IN NEW MExico x5oo-1846 (1991). For a first-
hand contemporary perspective, see FRAY BARTOLOM11 DE LAS CASAS, IN DEFENSE
OF THE INDIANS 4-53 (Stafford Poole ed., trans., 1974).
234. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 231, at 91-92.
235. D'EMiLIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 231, at 92.
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Indian could not convict a white of rape (or of any other crime, for
that matter), white men raped with impunity. 236 During the late 1800s,
the trafficking of Asian women was widespread on the West Coast,
creating a "distinctive system of sexual slavery."237
During slavery, slave owners had "institutional access" 238 to their
slave women, as they, by definition, could not rape their own property.
Even after slavery, "the rape of Black women by white or Black men
... was legal."239 If a complaint did not allege that the victim was
white, a court sometimes dismissed an indictment for rape. 240 Addition-
ally, states with statutes criminalizing rape of white women mandated
more severe punishments for rapes committed by men of color than for
those committed by white men. The Virginia Code of 1819, for ex-
ample, punished the rape of a white woman by a black man with the
death penalty. If a white man raped a white woman, he could only
receive up to twenty-one years. 241 Though many states changed their
laws following the Civil War, the legal system's treatment of rape
differed little from before.
In the post-Civil War South, "rape and rumors of rape became a
kind of acceptable folk pornography in the Bible Belt,"242 as the South
developed what one historian labeled the "Southern Rape Complex."243
The obsession to protect "white women's virtue" from black men
justified a system in which white men lynched black men for any
"inappropriate contact" with a white woman. Simply being a black
man implied that one possessed the intent to rape, even well into the
twentieth century. One Alabama court in 1953 wrote, "In determining
the question of intention the jury may consider social conditions and
customs founded upon racial differences, such as that the prosecutrix
236. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 231, at 92.
237. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 231, at 135. See also Lucie Cheng Hirata, Free,
Indentured, Enslaved: Chinese Prostitutes in Nineteenth-Century America, 5 SIGNS 3
(1979).
238. Jennifer Wriggens, Rape, Racism and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 118
(1983).
239. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 106.
240. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 106.
241. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 106 n.15.
242. Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Mind That Burns in Each Body: Women, Rape, and
Racial Violence, in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 328, 335 (A.
Snitow et al. eds.,1983).
243. W.J. CASH, THE MIND OF THE SOUTH 117 (1941).
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was a white woman and the defendant was a Negro man."244 In this
case, a black man with no previous arrests was found guilty of an
"attempt to commit an assault with an intent to rape." 245 The
defendant "was accused of muttering something unintelligible and
walking within six feet of Mrs. Ted Allen, a white woman." 246 While
presuming white women were chaste, the legal system presumed that
black women were unchaste-hence, unrapable247-and that for white
women, being raped by a black man was worse than death.248 Besides
disempowering blacks, the Rape Complex, in trying to protect white
womanhood, created fear in many white women and helped to main-
tain their powerlessness and dependence upon white men. 249
Recent statistics suggest that men of color are disproportionately
likely to be convicted of rape and to serve longer sentences than white
men convicted of rape. Between 193o and 1967, eighty-nine percent of
the men executed for rape in the United States were black.250 In addi-
tion, thirty-six percent of black men convicted of raping white women
were executed, while "only two percent of all defendants convicted of
rape involving other racial combinations were executed." 251 One now-
famous study analyzed 1238 rape convictions between 1945 and 1965 and
systematically "examined many variables in addition to race, such as
presence of a weapon and prior record of the defendant, to attempt to
account for the disparate numbers of executions." 252 The conclusion of
the study was that race was the only factor that could account for the
wide disparities. Though the death penalty for rape was finally
abolished, black men who rape white women still receive the harshest
penalties.253
Conversely, women of color are the least protected by the judicial
process. In the period between i96O and 1967, forty-seven percent of all
244. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 111 n.52 (citing McQuirter v. State, 36 Ala. App.
707, 709 (1953)).
245. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 111 n.52 (citing McQuirter, 36 Ala. App. at 708).
246. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 111 n.52 (citing McQuirter, 36 Ala. App. at 708).
247. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 121.
248. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 124.
249. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 125.
250. ESTRICH, supra note 7, at 107 n.2.
251. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 112-13.
252. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 112 n.60 (citing Wolfgang, Racial Dimensions in the
Death Sentence for Rape, in EXECUTIONS IN AMERiCA 114-20 (1974)).
253. ESTRiCH, supra note 7, at 107 n.2.
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black men convicted of committing criminal assaults against black
women were released immediately on probation. 254 According to this
study, "the average sentence received by Black men, exclusive of cases
involving life imprisonment or death, was 4.2 years if the victim was
Black, 16.4 years if the victim was white." 255 Professor Angela Harris
writes:
Even after the Civil War, rape laws were seldom used to
protect black women against either white or black men, since
black women were considered promiscuous by nature. In
contrast to the partial or at least formal protection white
women had against sexual brutalization, black women
frequently had no legal protection whatsoever. "Rape," in this
sense, was something that only happened to white women;
what happened to black women was simply life. 256
Bias in the judiciary remains. In a study on judges' attitudes toward
rape victims, one judge said, "with the Negro community, you really
have to redefine rape. You never know about them."257
2. "Reform" Cannot Support the Racist Meanings of Sexual Violence
Structural racism today functions within the legal system, necessitating
an awareness of the history of intersections between race and rape.
Wriggens argues that "those who work against rape and other forms of
sexual coercion must be vigilant not to support [its] racist social mean-
ing."258 For example, requiring mandatory sentencing, increasing
sentence lengths, and instituting restitution for victims will affect men
of color the most, and are likely to help white women predominantly.
Men of color are already disproportionately convicted of rape. Legisla-
tion which increases prison time will simply require men of color to
serve longer terms. Wriggens concludes that, "given the racist content
of the social meaning of rape, struggles limited to illegal rape are likely
to have the racist repercussions of targeting Black men." 259
254. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 121 n. 113.
255. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 121 n.113.
256. Harris, supra note 175, at 599.
257. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 120 n.10 4 (citing Bohmer, JudicialAttitudes Towards
Rape Victims, 57 JUDIcATURE 303 (1974)).
258. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 133.
259. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 140.
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Does the VAWA perpetuate the racist history of American rape
laws? Portions of the VAWA outside of title III involve many regressive
features. The increased federal sentences for sexual abuse in title 1260
almost certainly will affect men of color the most, as will the "High
Intensity Crime Area Grants." 261 These grants are targeted to the "most
dangerous" areas of the country to increase prosecutions of gender-
motivated crimes. The Attorney General will determine these
"dangerous" areas through Bureau of Justice Statistics, 262 which uses
numbers inflated by the racial bias in the judicial system just described.
The VAWA poses additional concerns for Native Americans since
Indian reservations, with some modification, are directly subject to
federal law. The Turtle Mountain Chippewa Tribe, represented by the
Native Americans Rights Fund, opposes the increased federal sentences
in the VAWA because "Indian people would be disproportionately
impacted. . . [since] Native Americans comprise the single largest
group sentenced under federal law for the sexual offenses addressed by
[the VAWA]." 263 In one year, between October I, 1989 and September
30, 199o, the U.S. Sentencing Commission reported that "approximately
6o percent of defendants sentenced for aggravated sexual abuse and 75
260. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 111-113 (1993).
261. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 121 (1993).
262. In § 121, the VAWA creates the High Intensity Crime Area Grants. The VAWA
adds new sections, beginning with Section 1711, to the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3711 et seq., as amended by § 4 of
Public Law 102-521, 106 Star. 3404. Section 1711 defines "high intensity crime
area" as "an area with one of the 40 highest rates of violent crime against women,
as determined by the Bureau of Justice Statistics." Section 1712(a) directs the
Bureau of Justice Statistics to compile a list of the 40 areas "with the highest rates
of violent crime against women based on the combined female victimization rate
per population for assault, sexual assault (including, but not limited to, rape),
murder, robbery, and kidnapping (without regard to the relationship between the
crime victim and the offenders)." Section 1712(b) states that the Bureau of Justice
Statistics may rely on two sources for making its determinations:
(1) existing data collected by States, municipalities, Indian reservations or
statistical metropolitan areas showing the number of police reports of the
crimes listed in subsection (a); and
(2) existing data collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, includ-
ing data from those governmental entities already complying with the
National Incident Based Reporting System, showing the number of police
reports of crimes listed in subsection (a).
S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 121 (1993).
263. Violence Against Women Hearing, supra note 5, at 299-300 (statement by the Turtle
Mountain Chippewa Tribe).
[Vol. 1: 163
1993] CONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE VAWA 237
percent sentenced for sexual abuse under federal law were American
Indian and Alaska Natives." 264 Two factors account for these high
numbers. First, Indian reservations are the most populated areas subject
to federal jurisdiction.265 Second, the law is "followed to the letter
when it is used against Indian people and other people of color."266
"Law and order" measures within the VAWA that target men of color
may undermine the Act's support.
Professor Kimberle Crenshaw argues that efforts to combat violence
against women often appeal to white elites. In a variety of forms, the
message is that the problems of sexual violence do not occur only in
"other" communities. The assumption behind this appeal is that "bat-
tering is a minority problem."267 The VAWA, too, relies upon these ap-
peals. Crenshaw cites Senator David Boren's opening comments in
support of the VAWA:
Violent crimes against women are not limited to the streets of
the inner cities, but also occur in homes in the urban and
rural areas across the country.
Violence against women affects not only those who are
actually beaten and brutalized, but indirectly affects all
women. Today, our wives, mothers, daughters, sisters, and
colleagues are held captive by fear generated from these
violent crimes-held captive not for what they do or who
they are, but solely because of gender.268
264. Violence Against Women Hearing, supra note 5, at 300 (statement by the Turtle
Mountain Chippewa Tribe).
265. Violence Against Women Hearing, supra note 5, at 300 (statement by the Turtle
Mountain Chippewa Tribe).
266. Violence Against Women Hearing, supra note 5, at 295 (letter from The Women's
Circle to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee).
267. Crenshaw, supra note 97, at 1258 (1991).
268. Crenshaw, supra note 97, at 1250 n.58 (citing 137 CONG. REc. S611 (daily ed. Jan.
14, 1991) (statement of Sen. Boren) (emphasis added)). Senator William Cohen
made essentially the same statement shortly after Senator Boren's comment:
[Rape and domestic violence] are not limited to the streets of our inner
cities or to those few highly publicized cases that we read about in the
newspapers or see on the evening news. Women throughout the country,
in our Nation's urban areas and rural communities, are being beaten and
brutalized in the streets and in their homes. It is our mothers, wives,
daughters, sisters, friends, neighbors, and coworkers who are being vic-
timized; and in many cases, they are being victimized by family members,
friends, and acquaintances.
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This appeal only works to a white audience. Rather than question why
abuse has been so long ignored when people thought it occurred only
in the homes of "others," this appeal continues the pattern of neglect
"that permitted the problem to continue as long as it was imagined to
be a minority problem." 269 Crenshaw concludes that framing the
VAWA in these terms likely ensures that women of color will not
receive full benefits from the legislation, even if the legislators behind it
intend otherwise:
Senator Boren and his colleagues no doubt believe that they
have provided legislation and resources that will address the
problems of all women victimized by domestic violence. Yet
despite their universalizing rhetoric of "all" women, they were
able to empathize with female victims of domestic violence
only by looking past the plight of "other" women and by
recognizing the familiar faces of their own. The strength of
the appeal to "protect our women" must be its race and class
specificity. After all, it has always been someone's wife,
mother, sister, or daughter that has been abused, even when
the violence was stereotypically Black or Brown, and poor.
The point here is not that the Violence Against Women Act
is particularistic on its own terms, but that unless the Senators
and other policymakers ask why violence remained insig-
nificant as long as it was understood as a minority problem, it
is unlikely that women of color will share equally in the dis-
tribution of resources and concern. 270
Legislators must do more to ensure that the VAWA does not reflect a
racial logic, as well as a gendered logic. They cannot overlook the
Crenshaw, supra note 97, at 1250 n.58 (citing 137 Cong. Rec. S611 (daily ed. Jan.
14, 1991) (statement of Sen. Cohen)).
269. Crenshaw, supra note 97, at 1260.
270. Crenshaw, supra note 97, at 1260. Crenshaw continues by implying that the
"fragility" of the coalition necessary to achieve legislation to combat violence against
women ensures it cannot take seriously concerns of diverse groups of women:
It is even more unlikely, however, that those in power will be forced to
confront this issue [of distribution of resources]. As long as attempts to
politicize domestic violence focus on convincing whites that this is not a
"minority" problem but their problem, any authentic and sensitive atten-
tion to the experiences of Black and other minority women probably will
continue to be regarded as jeopardizing the movement.
Crenshaw, supra note 97, at 1260-61.
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reality of violence against women of color, and only examine it when it
helps gain "white support for domestic violence programs in the white
community."271
Wriggens argues that the devastating consequences of this history
of racism are "the denials that black women are raped and that all
women are subject to pervasive and harmful sexual coercion of all
kinds." 272 One question often faced by women of color is "whose side"
to be on. Alice Walker writes, " 'Whenever interracial rape is men-
tioned, a black woman's first thought is to protect the lives of her
brothers, her father, her sons, her lover. A history of lynching has bred
this in her.' "273 Angela Harris describes the experience for black women
as an ambivalence arising from a history of necessity:
Thus, the experience of rape for black women includes
not only a vulnerability to rape and a lack of legal protection
radically different from that experienced by white women, but
also a unique ambivalence. Black women have simultaneously
acknowledged their own victimization and the victimization of
black men by a system that has consistently ignored violence
against women while perpetrating it against men.2 7 4
The history of racism and rape has forced some women into a dilemma
about whether to support legislation that works against gender-
motivated violence, such as rape, or to support those men whom they
perceive as being punished for what white men do with statistical
impunity, or whom they perceive as having done nothing at all.
No one is served by failing to convict abusers of women, except
the abusers. Some women of color do face a dilemma, but are also the
most vulnerable to sexual abuse. The Women's Circle, a group of
Native American women working to stop sexual abuse, testified at the
Senate Judiciary Committee's hearings:
We recognize that the law enforcement and judicial systems
are disproportionately harsh on people of color. We also
recognize that the increase in penalties in [the VAWA] will
271. Crenshaw, supra note 97, at 1260.
272. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 103.
273. Wriggens, supra note 238, at 139 n. 228 (quoting ALIcE WALKER, Advancing
Luna-and Ida B. Wells, in You CAN'T KEEv A GOOD WOMAN DOWN 85, 93
(1981)).
274. Harris, supra note 175, at 601.
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most effect [sic] Indian people. However, while we as Indian
women stand side by side with our brothers in the fight
against racial oppression, violence against Indian women is
causing great and irreparable harm not only to Indian women
but to our families and communities as a whole.275
Indeed, their testimony suggests that the problem is not that men of
color are convicted too often and serve overly harsh terms: "Federal
sentences need to be increased because compared to the violence com-
mitted, no one is being convicted or sentenced, Indian or non[-] Indian, on
or off reservations .... Federal courts are presently sentencing below
their own guidelines with sentences for nonaggravated sexual assault
now averaging 4 years." 276 Rather, rape convictions are not applied
fairly. The biggest injustice is not how severely men of color are
punished for rape, but how little white men are. The fundamental
problem is that the courts must apply sexual assault statutes fairly, for
when women of color protect men of color who have raped, in the
belief that the judicial process is unfair, they potentially injure
themselves.
This history of racism will affect cases brought under the VAWA's
civil rights title. Given the attitudes discussed above, women of color
will find it more difficult to prevail in civil rights actions, especially if
the perpetrator is white. Women of color are simply not believed as
often as white women in courts.2 7 When women of color do win, they
will likely receive smaller damage awards than would a white woman
for the same fact pattern. The viability of a woman's claim will depend
upon both her race and her attacker's race. Crenshaw also argues that
the scope of harms recognized as gender-motivated must encompass a
race consciousness: "Because Black women face subordination based on
both race and gender, reforms of rape law and judicial procedures that
are premised on narrow conceptions of gender subordination may not
address the devaluation of Black women."278 The VAWA will not
operate in a vacuum, but in a social context that reflects centuries of
275. Violence Against Women Hearing, supra note 5, at 295 (letter from The Women's
Circle to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee).
276. Violence Against Women Hearing, supra note 5, at 295 (letter from The Women's
Circle to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee).
277. Crenshaw, supra note 97, at 1269 (citing GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL
JusncE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 219-20 (1989)).
278. Crenshaw, supra note 97, at 1270.
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racism in beliefs about sex and violence. Even if never overt, the subtle
pressure of racial prejudice will play a tangible, even if small, role in the
thousands of cases that arise under the VAWA, resulting in a cumula-
tive race effect in the administration of justice.
III. REFORMING THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
Each of the problems discussed above requires a response. Even if
Congress neglects to respond after the VAWA passes, advocates and
judges should work to ensure that the Act fulfills its broad purposes.
Oversights in wording should not nullify clearly positive legislative
intent, especially when the problem is not one the drafters carefully
considered. Many of these suggested changes clarify what appears to be
the congressional intent by foreclosing strict readings of the Act.
This article has referred to the Senate version of the VAWA for
consistency. Because the two versions of the VAWA contain slightly
different language, this section of the article will sometimes refer to the
separate Senate and House versions of the VAWA, S. 11 and H.R.
1133,279 respectively.
A. Reforming the Cause of Action
The first four suggestions offer new statutory langauge for § 302, the
cause of action.
1. Expand the "Crime of Violence" Language
First, "crime of violence" in section 302(c) should be changed to "act of
violence" or, at worst, "act or crime of violence." The violent felony
language should be removed from S. 11 entirely. If the crime of
violence language remains, two compensating changes should be made.
One change is that "crime of violence" in title III should be inter-
preted according to the Sentencing Commission Guidelines 2so instead
of IS U.S.C. § 16. Using the Sentencing Commission Guidelines would
limit the scope of title III without limiting the cause of action solely to
279. This section cites the House title III language, though it was cut by the House
Judiciary Committee in November 1993. See supra note 2 for a brief legislative
history of the VAWA.
280. 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 4B1.2 (1993).
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violent felonies. "Act of violence" should likewise focus upon the poten-
tial for harm to the victim, whether or not the act would constitute a
criminal felony. "Act of violence" should include situations which
contain only the threat of force. The determination of whether a victim
believed in the presence of the threat of force should focus upon the
reasons for the victim's belief (such as a previous violent act committed
by the other person), the victim's vulnerability in relation to the other
person (including economic or emotional dependence), and her or his
psychological state during the act. The VAWA should allow evidence of
traumatic stress or "battered woman's syndrome" or similar psychologi-
cal states to help prove a belief in the threat of violence.
Alternately, if the felony limitation remains, an exception should
be made for "domestic violence." Section 3o2(d)(2) would be expanded
as follows (new language italicized):
the term "crime of violence" means... (C) or, acts of corporal
injury willfully inflicted by a person upon his or her spouse or
intimate partner, or any person who is the mother or father of his
or her child, whether or not such actions involved use of force
likely to produce "serious bodily injury."
This suggested language is adapted from the California Penal Code
section entitled, "Infliction of injury on spouse, cohabitee or parent of
child." 281 While not ideal, this would at least provide some measure of
remedy to those in battering relationships.
2. Enumerate Some Crimes of Violence
Second, S. 11 should conform to the House version of the VAWA,
H.R. 1133, by including some enumerated "crimes of violence." H,R.
1133 includes per se violations and defines "crime of violence motivated
by the victim's gender" to include "a crime of violence that is rape
(excluding conduct that is characterized as rape solely by virtue of the
ages of the participants), sexual assault, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual
contact." 282 Stalking should also be added to this list as well as batter-
ing of spouses or intimate partners. Under no circumstances in these
enumerated cases should plaintiffs need to prove additional force
beyond what the definition of the crime itself requires. If the crime of
281. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (Deering 1993).
282. H.R. 1133, 103d. Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(e)(1)(A) (1993).
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rape requires only non-consensual intercourse, for example, then that is
all that the plaintiff need establish for a VAWA cause of action.
Adding a list of enumerated crimes to the VAWA's cause of action
ensures victims the chance of bringing suits without having to prove
additional force or violence. Even if nationally inconsistent, a list of
enumerated crimes would at least create a baseline of offenses that are,
by definition, motivated by gender.
Even with this change, plaintiffs would still have to rely upon state
and federal definitions of rape, sexual abuse, and sexual assault that do
not adequately reflect the reality of the violence. Congress could create
a definition of sexual abuse within the VAWA itself, so plaintiffs would
not have to rely upon the very criminal laws whose inadequacies are the
reason for the Act. This would also make the Act nationally consistent,
as plaintiffs would not have to use legal definitions which vary from
state to state.
Though potentially expedient, this alternative is short-sighted. If
Congress chooses to recognize the inadequacy of criminal sexual abuse
laws, it should change them entirely, rather than create a definition
solely for the VAWA. Congress should rewrite the federal criminal
definition of sexual abuse.283 While Congress might not be able to
persuade states to adopt its model defintion in their criminal codes,
plaintiffs would at least have the benefit of a progressive federal criminal
definition for VAWA civil rights actions.
3. Create a New Structure for Litigation
Andrea Brenneke advocates a "title III" test that plaintiffs may use to
establish a prima facie case under the VAWA. Developed to address the
needs of battered women, this test avoids many of the problems in
traditional civil rights theory. To establish a prima facie title III claim,
a plaintiff would prove:
(i) she was a member of a protected class in a battering
relationship; (z) she was a survivor of an act or "crime of
violence;" (3) and the act or "crime of violence" did or was
likely to: (a) control her thoughts, beliefs or actions or punish
her for resisting the perpetrator's control; or, (b) cause her to
modify her behaviors, duties, attitudes or roles to avoid
283. 18 U.S.C. § 2242 (1988).
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further violence. 284
Brenneke contends that if plaintiffs meet the above test, this "should be
sufficient to shift the burden of proof of intent, to discriminate in the
title III context."285 As in some Title VII disparate treatment cases,
after a "plaintiff has raised an inference and presumption of discrimina-
tion, the defendant may place into evidence a nondiscriminatory reason
for the ...action to avoid a directed verdict." 286 The title III test
allows plaintiffs a real chance at succeeding. Brenneke worries that
abusers might be able to escape civil rights actions by offering what
appear to be valid reasons for their actions, but which are only
pretextual excuses.287
To avoid this problem, she argues that the "mixed motive" stan-
dard should be applied in VAWA actions, especially in acquaintance
situations in which many plausible "causes" for taking an action ex-
ist.288
The mixed motive standard, first developed by the Court in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,289 provides that the plaintiff need only "satisfy
the factfinder that it is more likely than not that a forbidden
characteristic played a part in the employment decision." 290 In Price
Waterhouse, the employer was permitted to make an affirmative "same
decision" defense-that is, that the employer would have taken the
same action even absent all impermissible factors. Otherwise, "where an
employer is unable to prove its claim that it would have made the same
decision in the absence of discrimination, we [the Court] are entitled to
conclude that gender did make a difference to the outcome." 291 Though
only a plurality opinion, Price Waterhouse established the standard of
mixed motives in employment discrimination cases.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991292 codified the mixed motive standard
for Title VII cases, modifying Price Waterhouse. The i99i Civil Rights
Act emphasized that plaintiffs meet their prima facie burden by proving
284. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 75.
285. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 76.
286. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 76.
287. Brenneke, supra note 8 at 77.
288. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 77.
289. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
290. Id. at 247 n.12.
291. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246 n.11.
292. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
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that sex was a "motivating" factor. The 199i amendment states that "an
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining
party demonstrates that ... sex . . . was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice." 293 The effect of a mixed motive standard is that if a plaintiff
can meet this burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove
it was not a factor. 294
The desired method of proof-mixed motive-should be made
consistent within the VAWA and with the Civil Rights Act of i99i.
Currently, section 3o2(d)(i) says:
the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a
crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis
of gender; and due, at least in part, to an animus based on
the victim's gender.
Though proving animus based on gender, in the second half of the
section, follows an "any part" standard, this is not true for the first part
of the section, in which plaintiffs must prove that the crime was
"because of gender or on the basis of gender." This language and the
examples cited in the Senate Report suggest that a differential treatment
model of discrimination should be used as a method of proof for this
part of title III claims. The language "because of' can mean sole
motivation, which would be disastrous for plaintiffs. Instead, courts
should employ the "mixed motive" or "any part" standard here as well.
A mixed motive approach should follow that used with the Civil Rights
Act of i991.
A suggested new wording for section 302(d)(i) (new language
italicized) is:
the term "act or crime of violence motivated by gender"
means an act or crime of violence committed in whole or in
part because of gender or on the basis of gender or gender
roles.
This new language incorporates three major changes. First, it clarifies
that the mixed motive standard is used when interpreting the "because
293. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, § 107(a).
294. Another change to the Price Waterhouse precedent allows the awarding of certain
damages to plaintiffs even when employers would have made the same decision
absent the impermissible factors. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071, § 107(b)(3)(B).
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of gender" language. Second, adding the language "or gender roles"
clarifies the meaning of "because of gender" so that it does not simply
mean because of biological sex. Often violence is committed against
someone because of their gender role behavior. As recognized by the
Court in Price Waterhouse, this is just as invidious as other forms of
gender-motivated violence and impossible to separate from it.295
Without this language, many women (and some men) will not be
protected under the VAWA. Finally, this language conforms to the
definition given in H.R. 1133, which does not contain the term
295. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-51. In Price Waterhouse, the Court decided that
stereotypes based on women's proper role behavior can form discrimination based
on gender. The Court noted some of the factors that Price Waterhouse relied upon
when it refused to grant Hopkins partnership:
There were clear signs, though, that some of the partners reacted nega-
tively to Hopkins' personality because she was a woman. One partner
described her as "macho"; another suggested that she "overcompensated
for being a woman"; a third advised her to take "a course at charm
school..... But it was the man who.., bore responsibility for explain-
ing to Hopkins the reasons for the Policy Board's decision . . . who
delivered the coup de grace: in order to improve her chances for
partnership ... Hopkins should "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled,
and wear jewelry."
Id. at 235 (citations omitted). The District Court decided that:
[S]ome of the partners' remarks about Hopkins stemmed from an im-
permissibly cabined view of the proper behavior of women, and that Price
Waterhouse had done nothing to disavow reliance on such com-
ments.... Price Waterhouse had unlawfully discriminated against Hop-
kins on the basis of sex by consciously giving credence and effect to
partners' comments that resulted from sex stereotyping.
Id. at 236-37. The Court upheld this reasoning, and rejected Price Waterhouse's
assertions that sex stereotyping did not matter:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when
an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they
matched the stereotype associated with their group, for "[iln forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Con-
gress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes." An employer who
objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait
places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job
if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts
women out of this bind.
Id. at 251 (citations omitted).
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"animus."296 Given the difficulties that the term "animus" can present
for victims of gender-motivated violence,297 the VAWA should avoid
using the term entirely.
The VAWA or its legislative history should contain examples of
mixed motive cases, not intended to be exhaustive, to illustrate proper
uses of title III. Examples could include a white woman attacked for
dating an Asian-American man, or a woman attacked as she leaves a
lesbian bar or event. Extreme examples, such as those involving serial
rapists who hurl misogynist slurs during their attacks, should be
removed from the legislative history, as these examples will prove
prejudicial to plaintiffs with less sensational, but no less valid, civil
rights claims under title III of the VAWA.
If Congress does not amend the VAWA, it is unclear whether
courts will permit title III plaintiffs to utilize the mixed motive stan-
dard. Though the Senate Report says that Title VII case law should
operate as a guide for interpreting what is gender-based, courts employ
a number of different methodologies in Title VII cases. Without further
guidance, courts will have great leeway to decide which methods to
impose on VAWA litigants. Unless the Congress sets out the methods
of proof for title III cases, courts may drag VAWA litigants through the
pitfalls of sole motivation differential treatment analysis, especially given
the extreme cases cited by the Act's authors as models.298 Brenneke
warns: "[T]he very inclusion [of an extreme example] provides insight
into the imagination of those who are creating the legislation and those
who will likely be interpreting it."299
B. Clari ing the Scope and Direction of the Act
The last two suggestions offer guidance for courts in interpreting the
scope of the VAWA's civil rights provisions as a whole.
296. The corresponding House language reads:
the term "act or crime of violence motivated by the victim's gender"
means ... (B) any other crime of violence committed because of gender,
or on the basis of gender of the victim.
H.R. 1133, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(e)(1)(1993).
297. See supra notes 53-56, and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 127-35, and accompanying text.
299. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 102.
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1. Relationship of the Parties
The VAWA's language should clarify that the relationship between the
plaintiff and defendant can in no way diminish violence committed by
the defendant, nor can "personal animosity" obscure an act motivated
by gender. The congressional findings in section 302(a) should be
amended to read, in pertinent part, as follows (new language italicized):
The Congress finds that ... (8) victims of gender motivated
violence have a right to equal protection of the laws, regardless
of their relationships to their attackers, including a system of
justice that is unaffected by bias or discrimination and that, at
every relevant stage, treats such crimes as seriously as other
violent crimes.
Congress needs to emphasize to the federal judiciary that violence
between acquaintances must be treated as seriously as violence between
strangers, especially when the parties are spouses or intimate partners.
As a start, Congress should adopt Brenneke's language to add a new
finding in section 302(a) (new language italicized):
The Congress finds that ... violent conduct by a domestic
partner that has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work, family or social performance or creates
an intimidating or hostile domestic environment is no less harm-
ful than such conduct in the workplace.
This finding could come after current congressional finding (2) in the
Senate version of the VAWA. Finding (z) states that "current law
provides a civil rights remedy for gender crimes committed in the
workplace, but not for gender crimes committed on the street or in the
home."300 Such a finding would indicate Congress' willingness to have
the model of a hostile domestic home environment applied in title III,
cases. Victims of violent subordination by spouses, intimate partners,
and acquaintances need to have the federal remedy provided in the
VAWA. Under a differential treatment model of discrimination, they
probably will not.
300. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(a)(2) (1901).
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2. Counteracting the VAWA's Racist Potential
Congress should express the intent that sexual assault laws be equally
enforced, and back that intent with action. The legislative history,
including the hearings, should discuss the historical and contemporary
connections between sexual violence and racism. The congressional
findings in section 30(a) should be amended to include a finding
stating that unequal enforcement of the laws based on race undermines
the Congressional intent to foster equal justice. One possibility is (new
language italicized):
The Congress finds that ... men of color are more likely than
white men to be prosecuted, convicted, and punished for crimes of
violence motivated by gender than are white men. Women of
color are less likely than white women to see those who commit
crimes of violence against them prosecuted, convicted, and
punished. Both of these patterns of racial disparities in the
enforcement of justice undermine the intent of Congress that all
laws be applied fairly.
The Attorney General's Task Force on Violence Against Women 301
should be charged with studying the racial character of sentencing, and
with offering recommendations for remedying structural inequalities in
the law. To do this, the Task Force should collect statistics on rates of
(a) reporting, (b) prosecution, (c) conviction, and (d) sentencing,
broken down by race of both victim and attacker, in combination with
each other. This study should focus on whether some patterns exist that
fail to provide equal protection (e.g., white men are less likely to be
prosecuted and convicted when they rape women of color than when
they rape white women). Based on this information, Congress should
withhold funds not only from districts that do not prosecute white men
as vigorously as men of color, but also from districts that do not protect
women of color as much as they protect white women.
In addition, Congress should eliminate the High Intensity Crime
Area grants. The money should go instead to victim services, as well as
treatment and prevention services for offenders. Intervention in these
"dangerous" areas should not focus on prosecution as the only answer.
Jurisdictions that receive money for increased prosecution of crimes
against women under any of the grant programs in the VAWA should
301. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 141-148 (1993).
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
be required to report their rates of (a) reporting, (b) prosecution, (c)
conviction, and (d) sentencing, broken down by race of both victim
and attacker, in combination with each other, to help ensure that
jurisdictions make efforts to increase prosecutions and protect victims
equitably. Next, The Offender Training and Information Programs,
which provide treatment for incarcerated men convicted of gender-
based crimes, found in H.R. 1133,302 should be included in S. 11, and
the funding for this Chapter should be substantially increased. 303
This is one area in which history is vital, both for writing law and
for enforcing it. Some parts of the VAWA already show some con-
gressional intent to enforce laws more equitably. First, the VAWA
grants money to states and Indian reservations for education to increase
prosecution, law enforcement, and victim services,304 as well as public
education.30 5 Further, the law removes some of the economic, if not
psychological, barriers to initiating action by allowing for the recovery
of attorney's fees. 30 6 An intent of the law should be to remove the class,
as well as race, disparities in the enforcement of sexual abuse law.
Finally, by educating judges, the VAWA might encourage more equi-
table conviction rates and sentencing.307 Nevertheless, the VAWA does
not do as much to promote racial justice as it should.
302. H.R. 1133, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 126-127 (1993).
303. In § 121, the VAWA allocates funds for the High Intensity Crime Area Grants. See
supra note 262. The VAWA adds new sections, beginning with § 1711, to the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3711 et seq.
§ 1732(d) authorizes for each of the fiscal years 1994, 1995, and 1996,
$100,000,000 to carry out the High Intensity Crime Area grants.
304. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 121 (1993).
305. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 161 (1993).
306. Section 303 amends § 722 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. § 1988) to allow
prevailing plaintiffs under the VAWA, as in other federal civil rights actions, to
recover attorney's fees at the discretion of courts.
307. Tide V, entitled the "Equal Justice for Women in the Courts Act," allocates up to
$1,100,000 to study judicial bias and develop model education programs for state
and federal judges and court personnel. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§§ 501, 514,
522 (1993). While § 512 suggests that programs for state judges include
enumerated points, such as information on "racial stereotyping of rape victims and
defendants, and the impact of such stereotypes on credibility of witnesses, sentenc-
ing, and other.aspects of the administration of justice," § 521 omits specific goals
for education of federal judges and court personnel. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ 512, 521 (1993).
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C. Why a Civil Rights Remedy is Necessary
Though this article has focused on the many ways that courts may
undermine the effectivenes of civil rights arguments, civil rights actions
are still powerful legal tools. Short of a radical legal revolution, civil
rights jurisprudence provides the best available legal remedy for ensur-
ing the safety of those harmed by institutionally supported forms of
violence, such as gender-motivated violence. Despite the limitations of
civil rights theory, no other strategy permits survivors of gender-
motivated violence the same chance of achieving even a limited form of
justice.
Civil rights arguments are necessary, but we need to change the
way we think about civil rights. Properly formulated, a civil rights
strategy can have important advantages, if it is historically contingent, is
tied to a political theory that focuses upon the subjectivity of those who
employ civil rights remedies, and is committed to transforming legal
practice. Brenneke accepts that the use of civil rights may disadvantage
women in some contexts, but argues that civil rights strategies can work
in conjunction with social movements:
Articulation of battered women's "civil rights," whether those
rights stem from Congressional enactment or state constitu-
tion is a passionate expression of the integrity of individual
persons and the value of women as a group. It is not a
perpetuation of victimization, but an embrace of empower-
ment. The notion of "rights,"... should be contextualized
within the social movement that articulates it.3 08
There are at least twelve reasons to employ a civil rights strategy to
combat gender-motivated violence, the first six of which are based on
advantages Brenneke states in the context of civil rights for battered
women.
309
First, a civil rights strategy can link violence against oppressed
groups with the historical context of that violence. This is especially
true when victims, advocates, and judges use empirical and historical
methods to ground inequality. A sophisticated vision of history can
capture the interactions of multiple fields of power, as well as the social
context of those fields. Often judges and juries do not have the
308. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 101.
309. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 103-106.
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necessary expertise to understand the context of gender-motivated
violence, which places an extra burden of persuasion on those who use
the VAWA. Opponents of the Act will no doubt try to portray acts of
violence as random, personal, or quirky, when the acts in fact reflect
broader patterns of discrimination and oppression.
Second, the widespread use of civil rights actions will expose the
commonness and pervasiveness of the violations. One of the most
powerful tools for sustaining oppressive institutions, especially violence
against women, is the ability to atomize persons' experiences, keeping
potentially powerful social alliances apart, and encouraging those who
experience violence to internalize blame for their circumstances. A
widespread use of civil rights as a remedy will also de-sensationalize the
extreme, "perfect" cases of discriminatory violence, showing that such
violence occurs routinely and in a variety of forms. One of the most
numbing aspects of gender-motivated violence is its routineness. Civil
rights laws should concern themselves precisely with cases of "everyday
domestic violence." Without trivializing the experience of surviving
violence, the routine use of civil rights remedies will expose the inter-
connectedness of gender-motivated violence in its diverse forms.
Third, use of civil rights can.reformulate the character of what is
socially appropriate behavior. Rights discourse carries weight in this
society. Acts that many once considered trivial or funny become ex-
tremely serious when cast in the language of civil rights. The history of
the African-American civil rights movement demonstrates this point.
From a generational standpoint, this may be the greatest value of a civil
rights remedy.
Fourth, a social commitment to preventing institutionally sup-
ported violence, even if the commitment depends upon those in the
institutions not fully understanding their roles in perpetuating the
violence, at least carries the hope of well-funded victim response
services, providing real benefits for many persons. Despite the increased
need for services for victims of gender-motivated violence, the services
remain understaffed and underfunded, easy targets for fiscal austerity.
Placing gender-motivated violence in the context of civil rights would
give advocates and victims leverage and legitimacy in seeking institu-
tional support.
Fifth, civil rights arguments strike a distinctively moral chord,
potentially forcing citizens to question the moral legitimacy of liberal
democratic governments that do little to stop gender-motivated
violence. The moral weight of civil rights remedies need not lie solely
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in an appeal to the liberal legal tradition's "commitment to neutrality
and abstractness," which often fails to produce equality in fact for
subordinated groups.310 Brande Stellings argues for grounding the moral
argument underpinning civil rights for gender-motivated violence in a
notion of citizenship:
Citizenship provides a place from which to launch the project
of recognizing rights, the "process by which hurts that once
were whispered or unheard have become claims, and claims
that once were unsuccessful have persuaded others and trans-
formed social life." The process of invoking rights not only
manifests a person's membership within a community by
demanding that a wrong be righted, but also strengthens that
tie to the community by expressing the person's faith in plac-
ing her fate within the hands of the community. Citizenship
shows us that public self-governance begins with private self-
governance.3 11
Stellings' concept of citizenship relies on the alternative liberal "ideals of
self-possession and self-governance," rather than neutrality. Gender-
motivated violence violates these ideals of bodily integrity and self-
possession, which provide a language with which to articulate civil
rights arguments.
Sixth, civil rights actions allow individual persons to obtain
monetary damages as compensation for their deprivation of rights.
Criminal prosecutions rarely involve restitution for the victim. The
VAWA civil rights remedy allows "compensatory and punitive damages,
injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may
deem appropriate." 312
Seventh, active use of the VAWA may have another long-term
consequence: a decrease both in the number of cases courts process and
the social cost of the violence.3 13 Many cite the potential flood of new
cases as a reason to oppose the VAWA. This argument not only aban-
dons victims of violence to their "fate," but also assumes that gender-
310. Stellings, supra note 57, at 215.
311. Stellings, supra note 57, at 215 (quoting Martha Minow, Interpreing Rights: An
Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1867 (1987)).
312. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §302(c) (1993).
313. Mary C. Dunlap originally made this observation in response to concerns that the
VAWA would deplete scarce judicial resources. Telephone conversation with Mary
C. Dunlap (Summer 1993).
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motivated violence does not drain resources elsewhere. Cycles of batter-
ing in relationships, for example, may develop until "serious felonies"
result. Many men kill or permanently injure their partners when pat-
terns of abuse go unchecked, and many women may feel they have no
effective recourse but to protect themselves from an abuser when they
have no legal option.3 14 In either case, the judicial system will see the
results later, only magnified in severity. In addition, the long-term costs
to children who grow up in abusive homes are enormous, as are the
long-term cost to the health care and criminal justice systems. The
Senate Report summarizes the grim statistics:
Our society pays a heavy price for this violence: 1 million
wom[e]n a year seek medical attention for injuries caused by
violence at the hands of a male partner; children in homes
with family violence are i5 times more likely to be abused or
neglected than children in peaceful homes; and finally,
estimates suggest that we spend $5 to sio billion a year on
health care, criminal justice, and other social costs of domestic
violence. Indeed, for the past 4 years, the U.S. Surgeons
General have warned that family violence-not heart attacks
or cancer or strokes-poses the single largest threat of injury
to adult women in this country. 315
And these figures only cover "domestic violence." Providing positive
routes for victims of this violence is a social and legal investment.
Understood this way, the suggestion that the VAWA should not pass
because it would flood the courts with mere "domestic relations dis-
putes" is not only short-sighted, but also perverse.
Eighth, civil rights actions allow those harmed to control the legal
action. Those groups traditionally powerless in the legal system have at
least limited power to control the process and to place themselves, not
the state, against their attackers. Criminal trials, when they do occur,
are often hostile settings for victims of gender-motivated violence: they
may find themselves under more scrutiny than the defendant and have
little, if no, say over the strategy which the prosecution pursues. 316
314. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, at 41 ("One-third of all women who are murdered
die at the hands of a husband or boyfriend.") (referring to UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE, FBI CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1991: UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS 19 (1992)).
315. S. Rep. No. 138, supra note 11, 41-42 (citations omitted).
316. Some have used the term "double victimization" to describe many abuse victims' cx-
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Ninth, civil rights actions allow a victim a chance of prevailing in
court. The VAWA burden of proof is the "preponderance of the
evidence," which is more favorable than the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard used in criminal trials. In theory, a plaintiff would only
need to prove to a factfinder that it is more likely than not that the
violation occurred. In actual practice, judges and juries may demand a
higher standard of proof before deciding that a defendant has violated
the victim's civil rights, but the preponderance standard at least gives
victims a chance to overcome the attitudinal barriers that often prevent
decisions in their favor.
Tenth, civil rights actions are necessary to overcome ineffective
state and local laws. The inadequacies of state laws, coupled with their
weak enforcement, in part, justify the need for the VAWA. Federal
remedies have proven necessary and effective in the past when local
jurisdictions were either unwilling or unable to protect the rights of
their citizens. In addition, federal courts are often a more effective
forum for victims wishing to present claims of civil rights violations,
especially when the inadequacy of a state remedy is an issue.
Eleventh, civil rights actions can spur reform in other areas of the
law, such as the criminal justice system. Sometimes local legislators
respond to the challenge of a tougher national anti-discrimination
standard by enacting more effective statutes and enforcing them.
Furthermore, the doctrinal development of the VAWA may spur
development of civil rights doctrines that courts can apply beyond the
VAWA. Many of the problems of applying civil rights remedies to
gender-motivated violence are not unique. As courts develop tests to
understand the problems in this new field of law, insights from the
application of the VAWA may revitalize civil rights jurisprudence in
other areas.
Finally, in the absence of other legal remedies, abandoning civil
rights sometimes means abandoning women's lives. Brenneke under-
scores the bottom line in all attempts to address gender-motivated
violence, legally or otherwise: "Despite the risks of civil rights litigation,
rights advocacy . . . should not be abandoned-especially where
periences of the legal system-first the victim is abused by the attacker, then again
by the legal system. See, e.g, Kristin Bumiller, Rape as a Legal Symbol: An Essay on
Sexual Violence and Racism, 42 U. MiAMI L. REv. 75 (1987); Amy Eppler, Battered
Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitution Help Them When the
Police Won't, 95 YALE L.J. 788 (1986).
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
women's lives are at risk."317 Civil rights cannot replace visionary social
programs, nor can they compensate for widely held attitudes that accept
gender-motivated violence as normal. Nevertheless, the existence of a
civil rights remedy provides a tool that at least some victims can use to
achieve real results. Civil rights litigation can only do so much, but it
may provide the only potentially effectively alternative for many victims
of violence. Under these conditions, failing to use such a tool is uncon-
scionable.
D. Conclusion
Despite its potential, the VAWA has a mixed outlook. Early judicial
interpretations might make it effectively unusable or may severely limit
its scope. On the other hand, alternative judicial interpretations might
liberally construe the Act's purpose, making it a source of progressive
litigation. In many ways, the Act might transform American civil rights
jurisprudence over the next few decades. The language of the Act and
its history are unfortunately not strong enough to ensure such a trans-
formation. Indeed, in many places the Act's language works at cross
purposes to its stated goals. At other times, the language in one part of
the Act undermines language in another part. Such an outcome often
results with legislation that is both lengthy and the product of years of
political compromises.
The VAWA exists at the intersection of the dual concepts of
traditional civil rights jurisprudence and "perfect" violence. The VAWA
does provide a positive remedy, but its application in federal courts will
depend upon the interplay of these two themes. In practice, most
persons using the remedy will probably succeed to the degree that their
harm fits the traditional model of a civil rights violation and that they
look like a "perfect" victim. Ironically, the VAWA was drafted to undo
this dual burden.
In order to realize the Act's potential, advocates and judges will
have to understand the myriad ways that these burdens operate in
actual cases, then actively work to counteract them. Doctrines that were
not developed to address gender inequality at best map poorly onto the
reality of gender-motivated violence. Using these traditional theories as
the measure of VAWA violations will ensure that the bulk of gender-
motivated violence-battering and sexual assault by acquaintances-,
317. Brenneke, supra note 8, at 100.
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escapes civil rights scrutiny entirely. The best future for the VAWA is
one in which courts fashion doctrine from the concrete social reality of
gender-motivated violence to protect those most vulnerable to it. t

